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Abstract. R. Duncan’s observation that friendship (filiva) is an important theme in Plato’s 
Gorgias has gone unnoticed for the past four decades. In the first part of this paper, I remedy 
this by discussing the theme of filiva in the Callicles episode. There, friendship, as opposed to 
flattery (kolakeiva), turns out to be closely connected with the practice of the philosopher, viz. 
with his frankness (parrhsiva). The nexus filiva – kolakeiva – parrhsiva can again be found 
elucidating the philosophical life in works of Plutarch (Maxime cum principibus esse 
disserendum and De adulatore et amico), Maximus of Tyre (Or. 14), Themistius (Or. 22), and 
Damascius (Vita Isidori). Guided by Callicles’ mocking description of the philosopher as a 
strange fellow hiding ‘in a corner’ (ejn gwniva/) – a caricature rejected by the aforecited authors 
– I follow the track of this motif in the second part of the paper and suggest that the Gorgias 
served as an inspiration in constructing a philosophy – even a Neoplatonic philosophy – that 
is not otherworldly. 
 
In a three-page 1974 note R. Duncan suggested that insufficient attention had been paid to the 
theme of friendship (filiva) in Plato’s Gorgias. So far his call to consider the Gorgias (in 
particular the discussion between Socrates and Callicles) a dialogue about filiva has gone 
unnoticed by and large1. However, Duncan’s concise observations do deserve an elaboration. 
I will start by lineary discussing the theme of filiva throughout the Callicles episode in order 
to reveal the dynamics of the positions taken by the interlocuters. Filiva as discussed in the 
confrontation between Socrates and Callicles will turn out to be closely connected to the 
practice of philosophical conversation (dialectic) and to the philosophical tevcnh. Frankness 
(parrhsiva), friendship’s close ally, and flattery, its arch-enemy, will prove pivotal terms in 
                                                          
* I would like to thank Geert Roskam for his ejpisthvmh, eu[noia and parrhsiva, Jeroen Lauwers for offering 
many useful suggestions and Liesbeth Schulpé for corre ting my English. A much less elaborate version of the 
first part of this paper was delivered as a lecture fo  the Koninklijke Zuid-Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Taal-, 
Letterkunde en Geschiedenis (Ghent, Belgium) in March 2013. I thank Kristoffel Demoen for then warning me 
not to overlook the problem of irony. This article was submitted in February 2014; although some references to 
more recent scholarship have been added, there has been no attempt at exhaustive inclusion of what has appeared 
since. 
1 Other than Duncan 1974 as far as I know only Woolf 2000, pp. 10-12 has mentioned n passant the importance 
of filiva in the Gorgias. I will translate filiva with ‘friendship’, a familiar though not entirely adequate 
translation. On the similarities and differences between the ancient concept of filiva and the present-day concept 
of friendship see Konstan 1996b and 1997, pp. 2-18. On friendship in classical antiquity see esp. Konsta  1997 
and also Fraisse 1974; Dugas 1976; Pizzolato 1993; Fitzgerald 1996 and 1997a. 
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understanding the practice of the philosopher and the philosophical life2. In the second part of 
this paper I will trace the reception of this specifically Platonic notion of philosophical filiva 
by Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, Themistius and Damascius. 
1. Filiva in Plato’s Gorgias 
1.1 Callicles intrudes upon the ongoing conversation out of exasperation, albeit not so much 
at Socrates as at his own allies Gorgias and Polus, Socrates’ first interlocutors. According to 
Callicles they both succumbed to shame3. As a consequence, he justifies his participation in 
the discussion by claiming that he, by contrast, will not be shamed by Socrates’ questioning 
(482c-e). He immediately goes on to prove this by making a charge against Socratic morals 
and pleading in defence of the right of the stronger to pursue his own pleasure, whatever the 
circumstances (482e-484c)4. 
 In Callicles’ opinion, Socrates is utterly mistaken in defending morality and – as a 
consequence – in his pursuit of the philosophical lfe: engaging in philosophy might be 
charming in youth, but it is pernicious to every person who wants to carry some weight as a 
citizen – who wants to become kalo;" kajgaqov"5:  
[W]henever they [i.e. philosophers] come to some private or political business 
(e[lqwsin ei[" tina ijdivan h] politikh;n pra'xin), they prove themselves ridiculous 
(katagevlastoi). (484d-e; transl. T. Irwin6) 
[T]his person [i.e. the philosopher] is bound to end up being unmanly (ajnavndrw/), even 
if he has an altogether good nature; for he shuns the ci y centre and the public squares 
(feuvgonti ta; mevsa th'" povlew" kai; ta;" ajgorav"7) where the poet [i.e. Homer, Il. 9, 
411] says men win good reputations. He is sunk away out of sight for the rest of his 
life, and lives whispering with three or four boys in a corner, and never gives voice to 
anything fit for a free man, great and powerful 
                                                          
2 On parrhsiva Scarpat 2001, a reissue of a 1964 monograph, remains the standard work. Schlier 1959 remains 
indispensable as well. See also, more recently, Sluiter – Rosen 2004. Coloured though highly influential and 
undeniably challenging are M. Foucault’s lectures on parrhsiva (Foucault 2001; 2008; 2009). The link between 
parrhsiva and filiva is the topic of most contributions in Fitzgerald 1996. On parrhsiva in Plato see Monoson 
2000, pp. 154-180; van Raalte 2004; Foucault 2001, pp. 83-107; 2008, pp. 180-344; 2009, pp. 67-152; Markovits 
2008, pp. 82-168. 
3 482d: aijscunqh'nai; 482e: aijscunqeiv". This is repeated by Socrates at 487b (aijscunthrotevrw, aijscuvnh", 
aijscuvnesqai). Earlier in the text Polus addressed the same accus tion to Gorgias (461b: hj/scuvnqh). Further on 
both Callicles (482c) and Socrates (494d, 508c) call the shame of the first two interlocutors to mind. 
4 Callicles’ focus on pleasure was already hinted at when he evaluated the discussion between Gorgias and 
Socrates not by its truthfulness but by the pleasure it had brought him (458d). 
5 Obviously Callicles’ understanding of kalo;" kajgaqov" – to his mind synonymous with eujdovkimo" – is different 
from Socrates’ (cf. 470e en 515a). 
6 For the Gorgias, I use the edition by Dodds 1959 and the translation by Irwin 1979. Throughout the Gorgias, 
Irwin translates parrhsiva by ‘free speaking’ and parrhsiavzomai by ‘speaking freely’. I modified his translation 
by replacing this with the more adequate translations ‘frankness’ and ‘to speak frankly’. Further on I will not 
indicate these specific modifications. 
7 Dodds 1959, p. 274: ‘In Homer an jgorav is a place of public assembly, not a market, and it is in this sense that 
Callicles uses the word’. 
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(meta; meirakivwn ejn gwniva/ triw'n h] tettavrwn yiqurivzonta ejleuvqeron de; kai; mevg
a kai; iJkano;n mhdevpote fqevgxasqai). (485d-e) 
Contrary to what one could expect, Callicles’ insulting attack on philosophy (484c-
486d), which Socrates has called his ‘beloved’ (482a: paidikav) just moments ago, is not 
immediately countered. Quite the contrary: Socrates commends the man who treated him with 
such contempt: 
I know well that if you agree with what my soul believes, these very beliefs are the 
true ones. For I believe that someone who is to test adequately the soul which lives 
rightly and the soul which does not should have thre things, all of which you have: 
knowledge, goodwill, and frankness (ejpisthvmhn te kai; eu[noian kai; parrhsivan). 
(486e-487a) 
What Socrates sets out here are the criteria for a c rect philosophical dialogue8. The three 
criteria are cumulative, as it appears from Socrates’ clarification (487a-d). Many people do 
not pass the test because, unlike Callicles, they did not receive a proper education: they lack 
ejpisthvmh. Others, although they do possess jpisthvmh, are according to Socrates ‘unwilling 
to tell me the truth because they don't care for me as you [i.e. Callicles] do’. A third group, 
including Gorgias and Polus, shows both ejpisthvmh and eu[noia, but ultimately lacks the final 
criterion: parrhsiva. This was shown by their shame, which led them to contradict 
themselves9. Now we can understand why Socrates was apparently not harassed by Callicles’ 
attack: by insulting philosophy he adduced evidence of his parrhsiva, which he had promised 
by resolving not to get shamed. In Socrates’ words: ‘And as for being the type to speak 
frankly without shame (parrhsiavzesqai kai; mh; aijscuvnesqai) , you say it yourself and your 
speech a little earlier agrees with you’ (487d-e). 
 Now Socrates can rest assured that if Callicles, who has met all three criteria, agrees 
with Socrates’ defence of the philosophical life, truth will be attained: 
For [if you agree with me] you would never have conceded it either from lack of 
wisdom (sofiva") or from excess of shame (aijscuvnh), nor would you concede it to 
deceive me (ajpatw'n); for (gavr) you are a friend (fivlo") to me, as you say yourself. In 
reality, then, agreement between you and me will finally possess the goal of truth 
(tevlo" […] th'" ajlhqeiva"). (487e) 
                                                          
8 Cf. Foucault 2008, p. 336: ‘Il me semble que, dans ce passage [Grg. 486d-488b], se trouvent definis, même 
d’une façon rapide et en quelque sorte purement méthodologique (comme règles de la discussion), le mode 
d’être du discours philosophique et sa manière de lier l’âme à la fois à la vérité, à l’Être (à ce quiest), et puis à 
l’Autre.’ Foucault 2008, pp. 335-344 discusses parrhsiva in the Callicles part of the Gorgias at the very end of 
his 1982-1983 Collège de France lecture series. For the characterization of the philosopher as a person testing 
(basaniei'n) souls in Plato see La. 187e-189a. That same dialogue makes clear how important parrhsiva is for a 
philosophical dialogue (La. 178a; 179c; 189a). On parrhsiva in the Laches see Monoson 2000, pp. 155-161; 
Foucault 2001, pp. 91-105; 2009, pp. 117-150. 
9 Shame and self-contradiction were already connected at 482e. 
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In this passage the three criteria are repeated. However, the order in which they are mentioned 
has changed in comparison to both the first mention and Socrates’ clarification. This, in my 
view, is not without purpose: here filiva is no longer solely connected with eu[noia, as it was 
previously10, but seems to have become a more encompassing label of which parrhsiva is also 
an aspect11. That this is Socrates’ understanding of the matter ppears from his referring back 
to Callicles’ profession of friendship (‘as you say yourself’). This profession (485e: 
filikw'"12) marked the transition from a general attack on philosophy to a personal 
exhortation to leave philosophy aside. Although Callicles himself emphasizes the eu[noia 
which led him to this exhortation13, Socrates, as we saw, mentioned the harangue as a proof of 
parrhsiva in his reaction. Thus Socrates seems to gradually bring parrhsiva into the concept 
of filiva, which in everyday language was primarily associated with eu[noia. Contrary to 
everyday filiva, the filiva established here by Socrates is a philosophical method with truth as 
its objective14.  
 The same conclusion can be drawn from the next scene. Once Socrates has encouraged 
his conversation partner to keep up his critical attitude (488a-b), Callicles continues his 
defence of amorality. Once again he emphasizes that he will show frankness in this endeavor 
(491e: o} ejgwv soi nu'n parrhsiazovmeno" levgw). Once again Socrates commends him for 
that: 
You're carrying through your speech nobly, Callicles, and speaking frankly. For now 
you're saying clearly what the others think but aren't willing to say 
(dianoou'ntai me;n levgein de; oujk ejqevlousin). And so I'm asking you not to slacken at 
all, so that it will really become clear how we should live. (492d) 
At the beginning of the conversation Socrates specifically denied eu[noia to those who were 
‘unwilling to tell me the truth’ (487a: oujk ejqevlousi dev moi levgein th;n ajlhvqeian). In this 
instance, however, the conduct of those who levgein de; oujk ejqevlousin seems to indicate a 
lack of parrhsiva. 
                                                          
10 487b: ‘Gorgias and Polus are wise and friends (fivlw) of mine, but short of frankness’. Cf. 447b, where 
Chaerephon calls Gorgias a fivlo". 
11 Both Schlier 1959, p. 871 and Scarpat 2001, p. 67-68 mention this passage from the Gorgias to point out that 
parrhsiva is an indispensable part of filiva. 
12 Dodds 1959, p. 276 deems it probable that in ejp eikw'" filikw'" (485e) the second adverb is a gloss on the 
first. That this is however improbable appears from Socrates’ reminiscence of Callicles’ profession of friendship 
(487e). This most likely refers to the use of filikw'", the only explicit profession of friendship so far. 
13 486a: ‘And look, my dear Socrates and don't be annoyed with me at all, when I'll be saying it out of goodwill 
(eujnoiva/) to you’. 
14 Aristotle emphasizes that filiva en eu[noia should not be confused (EN 1166b-1167a), thus indicating that they 
sometimes were confused indeed. The difference between filiva more philosophico and everyday filiva is 
depicted aptly by Plutarch, Quaestiones convivales 659e-f. Cf. White 1983, p. 870: ‘The object of it all is truth, 




 Once parrhsiva is brought into the filiva discourse and the rules of philosophical 
conversation are thus established, the discussion takes a crucial turn. Socrates starts to 
undermine Callicles’ equation of pleasure with the good. All of a sudden, after Socrates’ 
umpteenth exhortation to join him in not being ashamed and accordingly to uphold mutual 
parrhsiva for the sake of their philosophical discussion (494c: 
o{pw" mh; ajpaicunh'/. dei' dev, wJ" e[oike, mhd' ejme; ajpaiscunqh'nai), Callicles refuses to 
answer one of Socrates’ questions. Instead, he accuses Socrates of acting ‘absurd’ (494d: 
a[topo") and of asking questions like a ‘mob-orator’ (ibid.: dhmhgovro") because he keeps on 
applying everyday situations to Callicles’ theories. Once again Socrates expresses his 
confidence in the fundamental difference between Callicles and the other interlocutors (viz. in 
Callicles’ parrhsiva; 494d: mh; aijscunqh'/") and persuades him to answer after all. Callicles 
wonders if Socrates is not ashamed himself by his own ridiculous questioning (494e: 
oujk aijscuvnh/;) but appears to stand his ground in his reply. However, his amoralist thesis is 
no longer the outcome of his own convictions. It is merely an attempt to prevent his discourse 
of becoming ‘inconsistent’ (495a: jnomologouvmeno"). At this point an opposition has arisen 
between what Callicles thinks to be true and what he says. The promise of parrhsiva has been 
broken. Nevertheless, we could still expect the discus ion to continue for some time longer. 
After all, Callicles is still keeping up appearances by being consistent: the formal proof of a 
lacking parrhsiva (viz. the interlocutor contradicting himself, as in the cases of Gorgias and 
Polus) has not yet been produced. Therefore Socrates, never impressed by appearances, issues 
a final warning in the form of a conditional accusation: 
You're destroying your first statements (ou;" prwvtou" lovgou"), Callicles, and you'd 
no longer be properly searching for the truth with me if you start speaking contrary to 
what you think (ei[per para; ta; dokou'nta sautw'/ ejrei'"). (495a; transl. Irwin 
modified) 
The ‘first statements’ Socrates refers to are of course Callicles’ professions of parrhsiva15. 
 Unsurprisingly, the formal proof of Callicles’ broken promise presents itself soon 
enough. When Callicles retracts an earlier statement by claiming that it was only ‘a joke’ 
(499b: paivzwn), he is revealed to speak not only against his convi tions but also against his 
                                                          
15 Dodds 1959, p. 307: ‘Socrates is thinking of Callicles’ professions of parrhsiva.’ To my mind proof of Dodds’ 
interpretation can be adduced from the beginning of the Laches (178a-b) where parrhsiavzesqai is opposed to 
levgousi para; th;n auJtw'n dovxan (as it is in our Gorgias passage: para; ta; dokou'nta sautw'/ ejrei'") and 
likened to eijpei'n a} dokei' uJmi'n. Contra Irwin 1979, p. 69, who takes tou;" prwvtou" lovgou" to mean ‘the 
previous discussion’. If this were the correct interpr tation the Greek would be rather strained, for in the 
preceding sentence Plato used the singular (lovgo") to refer to the whole of his contribution to the previous 
discussion. Besides, by becoming inconsistent in the future (ejrei'") Callicles would not render invalid the 
discussion up to the point where he started being inconsistent. 
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earlier statements. In his reaction Socrates does nt refer directly to Callicles’ lack of 
parrhsiva; instead he passes judgment on their filiva: 
Ah Callicles, what a scoundrel you are. You treat me like a child, telling me now that 
the same things are this way, and again that they're some other way, and deceiving me. 
And I didn't think at the start that you'd voluntarily deceive me, because I thought you 
were a friend (wJ" o[nto" fivlou). But it turns out I was misled. (499b-c) 
Indeed, by breaking his promise of parrhsiva Callicles also broke the bond of philosophical 
friendship, thus justifying Socrates’ transition from an objective claim of friendship (487e: 
fivlo" gavr moi ei\) to a subjective one (499c: wJ" o[nto" fivlou). Socrates now cannot but 
conclude that Callicles is neither a friend nor a parrhsiasthv"16. The dialectical contract has 
been broken. 
What is more, in rejecting philosophical fi iva and its ally parrhsiva, Callicles has left 
the door wide open to the opposite of these concepts. This becomes clear when Callicles, in 
his attempt to end the discussion after his refusal to nswer Socrates’ questions, continues 
answering only because Gorgias insists. From that moment on the discussion, at least as far as 
Callicles is concerned, is continued not for truth’s sake (the intention of the philosophical 
conversation, cf. 487e) but ‘for Gorgias’ sake’ (505c: Gorgivou cavrin17). Friendshap has made 
way for flattery18. That this reversal was due to a lack of parrhsiva and not so much to a lack 
of one of the other criteria for friendship (viz. ejpisthvmh and eu[noia) is clear from the 
consultation between Callicles and Gorgias: 
C. But Socrates is always like that, Gorgias. He keeps asking these petty, worthless 
questions, and cross-examines. 
G. Well, what does it matter to you? Anyhow, it is not y ur reputation (timhv) which is 
at stake, Callicles. Do allow Socrates to cross-examine as he wishes. (497b; transl. T. 
Irwin modified19)  
                                                          
16 Contra Michelini 1998, p. 53, who states that at this point in the dialogue ‘Socrates has shown that frankness 
does not guarantee sincerity’. The alteration is on the contrary that parrhsiva is no longer the mode of the 
conversation. 
17 Cf. 497c: ‘Then go on you, and ask these petty trifles, since that’s what Gorgias wants 
(ejpeivper Gorgiva/ dokei' ou{tw")’ [transl. T. Irwin modified]; 501c: ‘I'm going along with you, to let the 
discussion progress for you, and to gratify Gorgias here ( i{na […] Gorgiva/ tw'/de carivswmai)’. 
18 In the Gorgias Socrates often links the pursuit of cavri" with kolakeiva (462c-463a; 502b-c; 502e-503a; 521a-
b). Cf. Isocrates, Ep. 4.6, where frank speakers (parrhsiazomevnou") are opposed to people who say everything 
with an eye to cavri", thereby ironically not being worthy of cavri" 
(tw'n a{panta me;n pro;" cavrin, mhde;n de; cavrito" a[xion legovntwn). 
19 To my mind most translations (including T. Irwin’s) and interpretations (including E.R. Dodds’) miss the point 
here in taking pavntw" ouj sh; au{th hJ timhv to mean ‘it is not for you to estimate their value [i. . the value of 
Socrates’ questions]’ (cf. Dodds 1959, p. 313, following L. Robin and B. Jowett). This standard interpr tation 
seems problematic for two reasons. (1) In accordance with the rules of dialectic, to which Socrates refers 
throughout the dialogue, it is actually the interlocutor’s task to value Socrates’ words (486e, cf. 461c-d, 466e-
467a, 472b-c, 475e-476a, 499e-500a). (2) The standard interpretation seems incompatible with Callicles’ 
following reply. He agrees to continue the discussion though he repeats that he deems the questions ‘petty trifles’ 
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What is revealed here is obviously not a lack of ejpisthvmh or eu[noia. The real problem is that 
an excessive self-consciousness has taken possession of Callicles. He feels like his timhv is at 
stake. In other words: he is a hamed – and this kind of shame has been established as the 
opposite of parrhsiva throughout the dialogue20. Callicles is ashamed to say what he thinks 
and thus becomes guilty of the charges he had brought against Gorgias and Polus21. 
 
1.2 After this revelation Socrates continues what can hardly pass for a dialogue anymore. 
After all, trying to keep up the dialogue form would only yield bad philosophy as long as the 
interlocutor rejects parrhsiva. Socrates’ basically continuing on his own is thus paradoxically 
justified by the rules of dialectic. Now that the difference between pleasure and the good is 
established, it all comes down to distinguishing good pleasure from bad pleasure. The 
question is which tevcnh can make that distinction. At this point the theme of filiva and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(497c). In other words: he repeats his judgment of Socrates’ method of questioning. If Gorgias’ message were 
really that this judgment was not for Callicles to make, it is quite unlikely that Callicles would have repeated his 
judgment so bluntly straight away, for he states explicitely that he is yielding to Gorgias’ wish 
(ejpeivper Gorgiva/ dokei' ou{tw"). The standard interpretation partly seems to be prom ted by the wish to render 
the particle ajllav in the next sentence (ajll' uJpovsce" Swkravtei ejxelegxai o{pw" a]n bouvlhtai) strictly 
adversative: do not judge the quality of questioning, but let Socrates ask the questions as he wishes. However, 
for ajllav ‘following a rejected suggestion or supposition’, thus translated by ‘well’ or ‘well then’, see Denniston 
1954, pp. 9-11. All this is compatible with the idea that the person who takes parrhsiva seriously has to abandon 
timhv from time to time, cf. e.g. Isocrates, Ep. 4.7. Thus, Callicles is unknowingly right when he calls the 
philosopher ‘dishonoured’ (486c: a[timo", cf. the assenting repetition by Socrates at 508c): as opposed to 
Callicles, the philosopher would never abandon his parrhsiva for timhv. 
20 With ‘this kind of shame’ I mean shame as far as it plays a role in the dialectical process, i.e. the feeling 
preventing an interlocutor to speak his mind (482e: aijscunqei;" a{ ejnovei eijpei'n). Cf. La. 179c, where initial 
shame (uJpaiscunovmeqa) is topped by parrhsiva, thus making a dialectical conversation possible. One could call 
this kind of shame the everyday definition (cf. Dover 1974, pp. 236-238: ‘[Shame is] a very powerful motive for 
conforming to the behaviour expected by one’s family, friends and fellow-citizens. […] The fear of being judged 
inferior is the kind of fear which overrules rational calculation’). It is the only kind of shame with which I am 
concerned in the present paper. However, in the Gorgias an important role is also played by a more 
philosophical kind of shame, being a valid moral intuition (cf. Race 1979; McKim 1988; Kahn 1996, pp. 138-
142; Moss 2005 with a reply by Futter 2009; see also Levy 2013, discussing the function of the closely r ated 
notion of ridicule in the elenchic examination). In her brilliant interpretation of the Gorgias Tarnopolsky 2010, 
pp. 98-110 and passim labels these two kinds of shame ‘flattering shame’ and ‘respectful shame’ respectively; 
she also discusses their relation to frankness (‘flattering shame’ being opposed to parrhsiva and as such to 
philosophical practice), ‘respectful shame’ being compatible with parrhsiva and as such, on the contrary, being 
an asset to philosophical practice. Cain 2008 calls the first kind ‘false shame’ and discusses the ambiguity 
running throughout the dialogue. Beversluis 2000, pp. 291-376 on the other hand does not take the deeper moral 
sense of shame into account, thus considering shame mer ly a rhetorical device of Socrates’ ‘shame tactics’. His 
critique of Socrates’ modus operandi is therefore often gratuitous. Conversely, McKim 1988 only discusses this 
deeper moral shame (although once he seems to distinguish ‘competitive shame’ from ‘moral shame’ (p. 41 n. 
17)), which causes him to neglect the relevance of parrhsiva in the Gorgias and dialectic in general. 
21 Cf. Dodds 1959, p. 307: ‘The unshockable Callicles is hocked at last’; Kahn 1996, p. 136: ‘Callicles’ defeat 
will nevertheless also be precipitated by his sense of shame’; Beversluis 2000, p. 369: ‘Plato accounts for 
Callicles’ recalcitrance not in logical or epistemic terms, but in psychological ones. Callicles’ recalcitrance is not 
traceable to his lack of knowledge or to his inability to follow an argument’; Monoson 2000, p. 164: ‘Callicles 
will not continue to speak with parrhesia about the subject at hand because his own manliness is now at stake’. 
Contra van Raalte 2004, p. 295, who judges that ejpisthvmh is the lacking criterion. 
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kolakeiva, up until now only relevant for the concrete philosophical practice of dialectic, is 
brought to a more general level. Socrates refers back to a moment in the discussion with Polus 
(462d-466a), where a remarkably elaborate classification of real and false crafts was 
introduced22. Socrates then labeled the false arts ‘flattery’ (463a; 464e; 465b; 466a; 466e: 
kolakeiva, cf. 464c: hJ kolakeutikh; [tevcnh]) because their only purpose is yielding pleasure. 
In addition to cookery, cosmetics and sophistry, rhetoric, the métier of Gorgias, Polus, and 
Callicles, is said to be a part of kolakeiva too. The danger of these parts of flattery is thatey 
tend to mimic (464c; d: prospoiei'tai) their real art counterparts very closely while thy are 
really nothing but a faint image, an ei[dwlon (463d) of these counterparts (sophistry 
mimicking legislation, rhetoric justice, cosmetics gymnastics and cookery medicine). 
 Just after having called this classification back to mind in his discussion with Callicles 
(500a-b), Socrates invokes a most strange deity: 
And for the sake of the god of friendship (pro;" Filivou), Callicles, don't think you 
should make jokes at me, and don't answer capriciously, contrary to what you think 
(para; ta; dokou'nta), nor again take what I say that way, as making jokes. (500b) 
Once again the link between friendship and parrhsiva (viz. not speaking para; ta; dokou'nta) 
is suggested. What is more, the rare invocation also proves relevant in the context of the 
classification of crafts23. In his reiteration of the distinction between real and false crafts, 
Socrates adduces other examples than the first time. Now philosophy represents the true craft 
aimed at the good, while kolakeiva, aimed at pleasure, is exemplified by ‘speaking in the 
people's Assembly, practising rhetoric, conducting politics the way you conduct it now’ 
(500c). This ‘flattery’ (501c; 502d; 503a) is thus rejected and replaced by Socrates’ care for 
the soul – the craft of philosophy, which invokes the god of iliva24. 
  In a next move Socrates goes on to explain this care of the soul by stating that one 
should at all times aim for justice and moderation instead of pursuing pleasure at all costs. 
The underlying cause of this – and this transition may seem uncalled-for to the reader not 
                                                          
22 Cf. Dodds 1959, p. 226: ‘This passage goes much beyond what is strictly required for the immediate purpose̓. 
Socrates points out the unusual length of his exposé himself (465e). After all, it seems to contradict his earlier 
disapproval of makrologiva (449b; 461d). In this case the long statement is justified by Socrates’ opponents’ not 
understanding the short version. 
23 The second invocation of the god of friendship in the Gorgias (519e) again combines Socrates’ call for 
parrhsiva (this time by deploring that Callicles does not want to answer) with yet another reference to the 
classification of crafts (517c-519c, cf. Irwin 1979, pp. 236-237). The third and last instance of the invocation is 
Eutyphr. 6b. Cf. Phdr. 234e: pro;" Dio;" filivou. 
24 Note that Socrates emphasizes that he is talking about rhetoric and politics as they were conducted in his day 
by people like Callicles. In the Gorgias, as in the Phaedrus, Plato seems to leave open the possibility of good 
(i.e. philosophical) rhetoric and politics. See e.g. Stauffer 2006 and Collobert 2013. 
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paying attention to the recurrent theme of friendship, flattery, and frankness – turns out to be 
filiva: 
[A man] should not allow his appetites to be intemprate and try to fulfil them – an 
endless evil – while he lives the life of a brigand. For no other man would be a friend 
(prosfilhv") to such a man; nor would god. For he is incapable of community 
(koinwnei'n); and when there is no community with a man (koinwniva), there can be no 
friendship (filiva) with him. Now the wise men say, Callicles, that heaven and earth, 
gods and men are bound by community and friendship (filiva) and order and 
temperance and justice; and that is why they call this whole universe the ‘worldorder’ 
(kovsmon), not ‘disorder’ or ‘intemperance’, my friend (eJtai're). But I think you don't 
heed them, though you're wise yourself. You haven’t noticed that geometrical equality 
has great power among gods and men; you think you sh ld practise taking more, 
because you are heedless of geometry. (507d-508a) 
Callicles was repeatedly called fivlo" by Socrates when he was still honoring parrhsiva (e.g. 
487e; 499c). At this point, however, he turns out t understand nothing about filiva25, while 
philosophy is established as the true craft of iliva26. The philosopher masters the craft of not 
committing injustice because he has a sense of the transcendent order. Accordingly, the rather 
abrupt mention of geometry could be taken as the repres ntation of philosophy in general27.  
The person who, on the other hand, goes out of his way to avoid suffering injustice – 
both Socrates and Callicles agree on this point – will only succeed by unjustly gaining power 
or by being in favour with the unjust powers that be (509d-510b). In other words: he will have 
to act like a flatterer. So, when the macrocosmic power of filiva just described is neglected, 
this presents disasterous consequences for the microcosm: 
I think one man is a friend (fivlo") to another most of all when, as wise men of old 
say, like is friend to like. […] Then wherever a brutal and uneducated tyrant is the 
ruler, won't he surely be afraid of anyone in the city who is far better than him, and 
won't he be quite unable to become a friend (fivlo") to him with all his mind? […] 
And if someone is far worse than himself, he won't be a friend either; for the tyrant 
will despise him, and never treat him seriously as he would treat a friend (pro;" fivlon). 
[…] Then the only friend (fivlo") to such a man worth consideration who's left is 
whoever has a similar character, blames and praises the same things, and is willing to 
                                                          
25 A eJtai'ro", as Callicles is called here (and Alcibiades at 519a), is certainly not the same as a fivlo", the former 
being a broader and much more ambiguous term. In other words: eJtairiva does not necessarily imply filiva. On 
the difference in Plato (and the problem of translating the two terms in English) see Bartlett 2004, p. viii and 
passim. Cf. also Konstan 1997, pp. 58-59 on the difference between the two in Euripides’ Orestes. To this 
evidence we can add a fragment of Antiphon (fr. B65 DK) where the eJtai'ro" is not only distinguished from the 
fivlo", but also identified with the kovlax. 
26 Cf. the description of the state as a community of friends under the leadership of philosophers in Resp. 9, 
590d. 
27 Cf. Festugière 1936, pp. 391-392. See Irwin 1979, pp. 7-8 for the growing importance Plato attaches to 
geometry from the Gorgias on. Cf. also Morrison 1958 on the importance of geom try, contra Dodds 1959, p. 
340 who states that ‘the humble status assigned to geometry […] is not in question here’. This passage could 
perhaps be compared to Plutarch, De genio Socratis 579a-d, where an exhortation to geometry turns out to be a 
disguised exhortation to philosophy in general.  
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be ruled by the ruler and to be subject to him. This man will have great power in this 
city; no one will do injustice against him without being sorry for it. (510b-d) 
Just as flattering crafts mimic their corresponding real crafts, flattery in personal relations 
mimics friendship. By being submissive to the ruler – and as a consequence constantly 
changing his mind in order to adapt himself to new rulers – the flatterer abandons any claim to 
parrhsiva by unavoidably contradicting himself. He merely poses as a friend (511a: mivmhsin, 
mimouvmeno", mimouvmenon), thus becoming the very antipode of the philosopher, whose 
‘argument (lovgo") is always the same’ (509a, cf. 482a; 490e; 491b-c; 527d). To this flattering 
craft (viz. the contemporary rhetorical politics that were opposed to philosophy in the 
reiteration of the classification of crafts) Callicles wants to exhort Socrates (511c). Socrates 
realizes indeed that whoever wants to rise to power in democratic Athens has to ‘become as 
much like the Athenian people as possible’ thereby giving up ‘what is dearest’ (513a: 
filtavtoi") to him. The ‘friendship with the Athenian demos’ (513b: filivan tw'/  jAqhnaivwn 
dhvmw/) pursued by Callicles is thus by definition based on flattery28. For want of parrhsiva – 
the friend of the people only says what the people wants to hear (513c: aivrousi) – this 
friendship can never be a true friendship, being not aimed at the good, but at the pleasure of 
the people29. 
 Now that the difference between the real craft of philosophy and the flattery of 
contemporary politics has been elucidated, Socrates calls for a renewal of parrhsiva one last 
time. He is turned down by the flatterer and draws his final conclusion. 
S. […] Tell me the truth, Callicles. Since you began by speaking frankly to me 
(parrhsiavzesqai), it's only just that you should go on saying what you think. Tell me 
now as well as before, well and nobly. 
C. Well, I'm telling you you should serve them [i.e. the people]. 
S. Then it’s flattery (kolakeuvsonta) you're urging on me, most noble sir. (521a-b; 
transl. T. Irwin modified) 
Callicles’ professed parrhsiva has been utterly perverted. Paradoxically he claims to speak 
frankly by encouraging flattery. Socrates on the other hand emphasizes that ‘all flattery, to 
ourselves or to others, few or many, we must shun’ (527c, cf. 522d)30. In the end the only 
practitioner of ‘the real political craft’ (521d: th'/ wJ" ajlhqw'" politikh'/ tevcnh/) turns out to be 
Socrates himself – the philosopher helping people in the direction of the good instead of the 
                                                          
28 Contra Konstan 1997, p. 103: ‘Unlike relations with kings […] one does not talk of being friends with the 
Athenian assembly. The issue of philoi vs. flatterers falls outside the discourse of the democracy.’ Cf. Socrates’ 
earlier mention of Callicles’ love (481d: ejrw'nte) for the Athenian demos. 
29 The opposition of hJdonhv and parrhsiva appears explicitely in Isocrates, Ep. 4.6: 
tou;" ajei; pro;" hJdonh;n levgein proairomevnou" versus tou;" ejpi; tw;/ beltivstw/ parrhsiazomevnou". 




merely pleasurable. The politics to which Callicles invites – and this is the very last sentence 
of the Gorgias – is worth nothing. 
 
1.3 The conversation between Socrates and Callicles has been a complex play of reversing 
positions. Callicles claimed parrhsiva and filiva but turned out to be a champion of k lakeiva. 
He accused Socrates of asking questions like a ‘mob-orator’ (482c, 494d: dhmhgovro"31) but 
exhorts to dhmhgoriva himself32. Socrates claims not to be a politician at all (473e), thus 
seemingly agreeing with Callicles’ caricature of the otherworldly philosopher, but turns out to 
be the only politician there is (521d). Socrates’ philosophy is depicted by Callicles as a 
practice of whisperers (485e: yiqurivzonta) in contrast with parrhsiva33, but is in the end 
established as the craft of parrhsiva – a frankness Socrates upheld until the very end of his 
life34. According to Callicles philosophy is useless fiddling (486c: ta; komya; tau'ta), but, as 
it turns out, this description can be applied to his own endeavors (521d: ta; komya; tau'ta). 
Callicles deems philosophers to be unmanly cowards (485d: ajnavndrw/), though the real 
coward turns out to be him, while real courage is philosophical parrhsiva35. He considers 
philosophers ridiculous (484e: twice katagevlastoi; 485a: katagevlaston) but makes himself 
look ridiculous in the discussion (509a: katagevlasto"). In other words: during the dialogue 
the roles are completely reversed. The philosopher has come out of the corner – a place not 
suited for Socrates as we know him anyhow – and the anti-philosopher has been driven into 
it36. 
                                                          
31 Cf. 482c: dhmhgorei'"; 482e: dhmhgorikav. 
32 At 503a kolakeiva, to which Callicles invites, is identified with dhmhgoriva. 
33 Cf. Dodds 1959, p. 275, who comments on yiqurivzonta by pointing out that ‘the philosopher does not dare to 
speak his mind plainly and in public’ (my italics). 
34 Cf. Irwin 1979, p. 129: ‘It will appear later that Socrates is the only one who really speaks freely and tells the 
truth without concern for personal safety’. 
35 Near the end of the dialogue Socrates states that ‘being put to death itself – no one fears that unless he's 
altogether unreasoning and unmanly (a[nandro")’. It is precisely by this fear that Callicles is defined (see Austin 
2013). Callicles’ unmanliness is pointed out as well, when he is shamed into rejecting parrhsiva when 
confronted with the fact that his understanding of the good life resembles the life of a catamite (494e: 
oJ tw'n kinaivdwn bivo"), cf. the analysis of this passage by Monoson 2000, p. 164 and her remark that at the end 
of the conversation ‘Callicles is reduced to advocating precisely the kind of risk-averse conventional attitude he 
had earlier derided’. That parrhsiva on the other hand is a sign of courage is made clear at 494d, cf. 495c where 
the connection between ejpisthvmh and ajndreiva is mentioned and 507b where the just and pious man is shown to 
be brave as well. The courage involved in upholding parrhsiva is of great importance in the interprations of 
Foucault 2009. 
36 Socrates certainly did not shun the public ajgorav and its surroundings, where he used to address all and sundry 
with unusual questions. Cf. e.g. Xenophon, Mem. 1.1.10; 3.10.1; 4.2.1; Plato, Ap. 17c; Phdr. 230d. Note that at 
the beginning of the Gorgias Socrates and Chaerephon are just arriving from… the ajgorav (447a). To my mind 
the excellent interpretation of the Gorgias by Festugière 1936, pp. 381-400 has after all these y ars lost nothing 
of its relevance in showing how in this work vita contemplativa and vita activa are in fact not opposed but 
reconciled. On the other hand, it should be pointed out (as an anonymous reviewer kindly did) that Callicles' 
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Then what should we think of Socrates’ attribution of parrhsiva and by extention of 
filiva to Callicles? Was he utterly mistaken? That does not sound like Plato’s Socrates. Was 
he being merely ironic or even sarcastic? In any case not in the way most interpretations tend 
to understand the irony37. Callicles does posses the parrhsiva Socrates is ascribing to him 
(viz. the brutal parrhsiva he showed in his anti-philosophical harangue): the attribution in 
itself is not ironic. But it is true that the use of the term is ironic – or at least ambiguous. 
Callicles’ parrhsiva is the parrhsiva as it functions in the Athenian democracy: a parrhsiva 
acting frankly and even brutally or provocatively, but vanishing when the majority is 
unfavorable and the speaker’s reputation is at stake38. Contrary to this Socrates gradually 
introduces a more philosophical parrhsiva that does not take orders from a majority but is led 
only by its own consistency39. The irony at play here is what G. Vlastos called ‘complex 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
view of the otherworldly philosopher bears some striking similarities to the view expressed by Socrates himself 
in the famous Theaetetus digression (172c-177c). However, in this case as well, the conclusion may well be that 
the apparently approving description of the otherworldly philosopher should not be taken at face value nd that it 
paints a one-sided picture of the philosophical life. See the inspiring discussions, often stressing the contrast 
between Socrates and this apparently ideal philosopher, by Rue 1993; Mahoney 2004; Lännström 2011. 
37 Jaeger 1954, pp. 205-206 (‘die bittere Ironie dieser Vorausbewertung der Leistung des Kallikles’); Scarpat 
2001, p. 68 (‘naturalmente ironiche’); Race 1979, p. 200 (‘marvelous irony’); Spina 1986, p. 93 (‘ironicamente’); 
McKim 1988, p. 40 (‘Socrates is being just as ironical about frankness as he is about knowledge and goo will’); 
Tarnopolsky 2010, p. 95 (‘Socrates sarcastically praises Callicles’) contra Beversluis 2000, pp. 340-341 
(Socrates’ attribution of parrhsiva is ‘one of Socrates’ rare, non-ironic compliments’); van Raalte 2004, p. 286. 
38 Cf. van Raalte 2004, p. 288: ‘[Callicles] is simply saying whatever the dh'mo" wants – a kind of caricature of 
democratic parrhêsia curbed by shame, strategically adopted by Callicles in daily practice.’ Similarly, at 471e-
472a Socrates explains to Polus the difference between refutation in court, where number and reputation 
(uJpo; pollw'n kai; dokou'ntwn) prevail, and philosophical refutation, where truth is all that counts. The situation 
as we have it in the case of Callicles can be contrasted with the situation in the Laches, where after philosophical 
parrhsiva (178a; 179c; 189a) has done its job, it is ‘by knowledge (ejpisthvmh/) [that] one ought to make 
decisions, if one is to make them well, and not by majority rule (ouj plhvqei)’ (184e [transl. R. Kent Sprague]). 
Cf. Foucault 2001, p. 96: ‘[U]nlike the parrhesiastes who addresses the demos in the assembly, for example, 
here [in the Laches] we have a parrhesiastic game which requires a personal, face to face relationship.’ As we 
saw earlier, Socrates described Callicles’ particular brand of parrhsiva as ‘saying clearly what the others think 
but aren't willing to say’ (492d: levgei" a{ oiJ a[lloi dianoou'ntai mevn, levgein de; oujk ejqevlousin). The mention 
of the others might well be significant in distinguishing everyday democratic parrhsiva from philosophical 
parrhsiva: while the philosopher speaks his mind, Callicles is in fact speaking the mind of the others. Compare 
Callicles’ breakdown caused by excessive care for his timhv with Gorgias’ concern for the wishes of the audience 
(458b-e). Plato mentions democratic parrhsiva in R. 8.557b. On parrhsiva in Athenian democracy and political 
parrhsiva in general see e.g. Momigliano 1973; Monoson 2000, pp. 51-63 (with more references at p. 51 n. 2); 
Saxonhouse 2005; Markovits 2008; Landauer 2012. 
39 Cf. the interpretation by Monoson 2000, pp. 161-165 of how ‘Plato appropriates the role of speaking with 
parrhesia for philosophy (and Socrates) in his effort to articulate the political and moral work philosophy can do’ 
(p. 165). Although I agree with Monoson’s reading of the Gorgias in general, she tends to overemphasize the 
similarities between democratic and philosophical parrhsiva for the purpose of her general point that the view of 
Plato as a virulent antidemocrat should be reconsidered. Cf. Erler 2011, p. 162, who discusses the paradoxical 
combination of parrhsiva with Socratic irony (the latter always involving a degree of concealment which the 
former seems to exclude): ‘[T]he Gorgias illustrates the transformation and integration of p litical parrhêsia into 
a philosophical context’ (see also p. 157 for a more general characterization of this technique of Plato’s). 
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irony’: ‘what is said both is and isn’t what is meant: its surface content is meant to be true in 
one sense, false in another’40. 
The same goes for Callicles’ ejpisthvmh and eu[noia. He was in all likelihood an 
educated young man and a skilled conversationalist by Athenian standards, and would, thus, 
as a pepaideumevno", able to give account (lovgon didovnai) of his actions and opinions, rightly 
be credited with ejpisthvmh within the Athenian community. He also sincerily seems to worry 
about Socrates’ life, thus showing a fairly commonsensical eu[noia until the very end of the 
dialogue (511b; 521a-c). His ejpisthvmh (as is the whole of the Athenian education system in 
Socrates’ eyes), however, is not founded upon a true tevcnh and is consequently nothing like 
the ejpisthvmh Socrates introduced41, nor is his eu[noia in worrying about the survival of 
Socrates’ body like the Socratic eu[noia which cares for the soul42. Three times Socrates has 
introduced a philosophical version of an everyday concept43, and three times Callicles has 
failed to live up to the newly introduced standards of philosophy and thus of philosophical 
filiva44. 
This filiva, its ally parrhsiva and its enemy kolakeiva played a double role in the 
discussion: on the concrete level of the procedure of the conversation (the practice of 
philosophy as a dialogue with certain rules, viz. ejpisthvmh, eu[noia and parrhsiva45) and on 
                                                          
40 Vlastos 1991, p. 31. Cf. also pp. 21-44 and pp. 236- 42 (with at pp. 240-241a case study of Socrates’ 
complex-ironic statement that he is at the same timnot a politician and the only Athenian politician).  
41 The analysis of Dodds 1959, p. 279 comes close to this by parenthetically remarking that ‘Socrates does not 
really credit Callicles with ejpisthvmh (in the Socratic sense)’. More problematic, however, are Dodds’ statements 
that, while he deems the ascription of ejpisthvmh ironic, the ‘other compliments [viz. eu[noia and parrhsiva] need 
not be taken as purely ironical’ and that Socrates’ profession that truth will be attained when he andCallicles 
will have reached agreement (486e-487e) is ‘not ironical’ (Dodds’ italics). Obviously this last claim can only be 
uttered without irony if all three criteria (and not, as Dodds has it, only two out of three) have been m t (cf. 487a: 
gavr indicating the link between the attainment of truth and the three criteria). This apparent inconsistency in 
Dodds’ interpretation can be avoided by considering complex irony. 
42 Austin 2013. 
43 Cf. Socrates’ remark that, although Callicles claims to be better, Callicles’ “better” is different from Socrates’ 
“better” (512a). Foucault 2008, p. 343 at the very nd of his 1982-1983 Collège the France lecture seri s, just 
after admitting that ‘il faudrait évidemment compliquer un peu les choses, même pas mal, malheureusement j  
n’ai pas le temps…’, suggests a similar interpretation: ‘Car en fait ce jeu se joue à deux, c’est-à-dire que ni 
l’ epistemê [sic], ni l’eunoia, ni la parrêsia de Calliclès ne sont les mêmes que l’epistemê [sic], l’eunoia et la 
parrêsia de Socrate.’ Unfortunately, he does not take up the interpretation of the Gorgias in the next year’s 
lectures (although he mentions the part where Gorgias is speaking, see Foucault 2009, pp. 134-135). 
44 To my mind the relevance of ejpisthvmh, eu[noia and parrhsiva in the Gorgias is not limited to the 
conversation with Callicles. In a note at the end of this paper I try to extrapolate some of my conclusions. 
45 Clement of Alexandria (Paed. 1.11.97.3) cites ejpisthvmh, eu[noia and parrhsiva as the three reasons why the 
divine paidagwgov" should be trusted. However, the three criteria are put in a purely biblical context and have as 
such no bearing on the Gorgias (cf. Scarpat 2001, p. 125-126). A passage from Isocrates’ Ad Nicoclem (27-28) is 
of greater interest. While discussing what friends (fivlou") Nicocles, the future ruler of Salamis, should seek 
after, Isocrates advises to grant parrhsiva to whomever displays frovnhsi", to be careful for flatterers 
(kolakeuvonta") and to cherish advisers extending eu[noia. As in the Gorgias filiva is thus characterized by 
ejpisthvmh/frovnhsi", eu[noia and kolakeiva. Cf. also Isocrates’ letter to Antipater, where parrhsiva is considered 
evidence of goodwill towards friends (Epist. 4.4: th'" eujnoiva" th'" pro;" fivlou", cf. 4.9-10) and is opposed to 
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the more general level of the subject matter of the conversation (the craft of philosophy as the 
search for the good life). (1) Callicles distinguishe  himself from the other interlocutors 
because of his parrhsiva, a concept which Socrates subsequently involves in a new 
understanding of iliva. Callicles’ parrhsiva and filiva cannot live up to the standards of 
philosophy: out of shame he eventually stops speaking his mind, starts contradicting himself 
and turns to kolakeiva by serving the pleasure of Gorgias. (2) Within Socrates’ classification 
of true arts and flatteries, the rhetorical politics Callicles advocates belong to the kolakeivai, 
while Socrates’ philosophy is in accordance with the cosmic filiva. Philosophy aims for the 
good, not merely for the pleasurable. By never contradicting herself, philosophy turns out to 
be the craft of parrhsiva. On both levels filiva goes hand in hand with parrhsiva and is 
opposed to kolakeiva. In both cases the stairway to filiva turns out to be philosophy46.  
As a rule in current scholarship Aristotle is considered the first to develop a 
philosophy of friendship47. Moreover, if Plato’s legacy is noted, in general only Lysis, 
Phaedrus and/or Symposium are taken into account48. However, I hope to have enforced R. 
Duncan’s point that Plato’s Gorgias should also be considered a source of a philosophy f 
friendship and of philosophy as friendship49. What is more: the important nexus of friendship, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the pursuit of hJdonhv and cavri" (both signs of flattery, as appears from the Gorgias) (ibid.) and to flattery (Epist. 
4, 7: kolakei'ai). On parrhsiva in Isocrates see Landauer 2012 and also Spina 1986, pp. 87-90; Konstan 1997, 
pp. 93-98 and pp. 101-104; Scarpat 2001, pp. 55-57 and pp. 68-69; Foucault 2001, pp. 80-83. 
46 From the very beginning of the dialogue, the opposition of Socratic dialectic and Calliclean rhetoric is 
prepared. The Gorgias starts by Socrates and Chaerephon’s arriving late for Gorgias’ rhetorical show (447a: 
ejpedeivxato; 447b: twice ejpideivxetai; 447c: ejpivdeixin, ejpideivxew": the sophistic terminology is being 
emphasized, cf. Dodds 1959, pp. 189-190). Socrates indicates that he is not interested in epideictic rhetoric and 
asks if Gorgias would on the contrary (447b: ajll᾿) enter a dialogue with him (447c: dialecqh'nai). The same 
opposition is immediately applied to Polus: when Polus wants to take Gorgias’ place – the latter needs some rest 
after his show – Socrates soon realizes that ‘Polus is more practised in what is called the rhetorical cr ft 
(rJhtorikhvn) than in dialogue (dialevgesqai)’ (448d, cf. Socrates’ repeating this at 471d). Throughout the 
discussion with Polus ‘Plato mocks the rhetorician’s i eptitude at the philosopher’s game of dialectic’ (Dodds 
1959, p. 223). 
47 Fitzgerald 1997b, p. 3; 1997c, pp. 33-34; Schroeder 1997; Fraisse 1974, pp. 189-286. Frazier 2007, p. 31 and 
El Murr 2014, p. 3 rightly remark that Plato’s philosophy of friendship deserves more attention. 
48 E.g. Price 1989; Reeve 2006; Nichols 2009. Cf. also Fraisse 1974, pp. 125-188; Pizzolato 1993, pp. 37-47. See 
Fitzgerald 1997a, p. 7 n. 9 for more references. Of course there are exceptions, see e.g. El Murr 2012and Caluori 
2013 on friendship in the Republic; Schofield 2013 and El Murr 2014 (with the referenc s at p. 28 n. 10) on 
friendship in the Laws. 
49 The theme of philosophy as friendship is not absent from the other dialogues on friendship. See esp. the 
interpretation of the Lysis by Nichols 2006 and 2009, pp. 152-194. Nichols 2009, p. 154: ‘Far from replacing 
friendship with philosophy as the truly satisfying human activity, or turning to the philosopher’s relation to 
wisdom as the exemplar of friendship, I argue that we must understand philosophy as an experience analogous to 




flattery and frankness, the occurence of which has always been situated in Hellenistic 
philosophy50, seems to have emerged already in Plato. 
2. The motif in later tradition 
 In the second part of this paper I would like to track down this nexus in four later 
ancient authors, confining myself to passages where filiva is linked to the practice of the 
philosopher coming out of his corner and thus rejecting Callicles’ caricature of philosophy 
hiding ejn gwniva/. My suggestion will be that these authors were inspired by Plato’s Gorgias. 
The texts under discussion are Plutarch’s That a philosopher ought to converse especially 
with men in power and How to tell a flatterer from a friend, Maximus of Tyre’s By what 
criteria should one distinguish flatterer from friend (Or. 14), Themistius’ oration On 
Friendship (Or. 22) and Damascius’ Life of Isidore. 
2.1 Although he was an important exponent of theoretical school philosophy in his time51, 
Plutarch (ca. 45 – ca. 125) could not possibly be compared to the philosophers Callicles 
ridiculed. That Plutarch led an active, political life is beyond any doubt52. He could not settle 
for otherworldliness, nor did he ever leave philosophy in order to indulge in worldly affairs. 
In the short work That a philosopher ought to converse especially with men in power (Maxime 
cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum) this balanced attention for both philosophy 
and politics is exemplified. 
In this work Plutarch encourages philosophers to foll w his example in not shunning 
political figures. Somewhat surprisingly it is the philosopher’s task to seek out these figures 
and to advise them as actively as possible. From the very outset, this turns out to be an 
                                                          
50 Konstan 1996a, p. 7:‘While the association between th  three terms [i.e. friendship, flattery, and frankness] 
may appear to be natural, it is in fact the product of a specific cultural moment. […] [T]he conceptual complex 
consisting of friendship, flattery, and frankness emerged in Hellenistic discourse’. Cf. Konstan 1997, p. 15 and p. 
21. Konstan’s statement seems to presuppose a strict distinction between ethical and political spheres: according 
to him, whereas in the classical period parrhsiva was a purely political concept, in Hellenistic times it became an 
ethical concept under the influence of the expansion of the political sphere (Konstan 1997, p. 103; cf. Peterson 
1929; Momigliano 1973, p. 259-260; Foucault 2001, pp. 86-87; Erler 2011, p. 156 and p. 159). Such distinction 
however seems untenable, certainly in a Platonic context where the ideal state is a reflection of the well-arranged 
soul (cf. the criticism of Foucault by Mulhern 2004 and also Spina 1986, pp. 78-95; Gallo 1988a, pp. 21-22; 
1988b, p. 121; Whitmarsh 2006, p. 97). 
51 Cf. e.g. his De animae procreatione in Timaeo and Quaestiones platonicae. See e.g. Dillon 1996, pp. 184-230 
on Plutarch’s theoretical philosophy. 
52 As a young man he was sent to the proconsul of Achaea as an envoy. Throughout his life he remained closely 
associated with local politics in his hometown Chaeron a and was no stranger on the Roman political scene. In 
all likelihood, his rich political carreer was crowned by his receiving the ornamenta consularia from Trajan and 
his appointment as procurator of Greece by Hadrian. On Plutarch’s life and works see e.g. Russell 2001; Sirinelli 
2000; Lamberton 2001. A succinct overview of Plutarch’s political life can be found in Roskam 2009, pp. 17-19, 
see also e.g. Renoirte 1951, pp. 25-27; Ziegler 1951, cols. 657-659; Jones 1971, pp. 13-38. On his political 
philosophy see Aalders 1982; Aalders – de Blois 1992; de Blois e.a. 2004-2005. 
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exhortation to filiva. In the first sentence the addressee is congratuled because he is ‘prizing, 
pursuing, welcoming, and cultivating the friendship [with political leaders53] - a friendship 
which will prove useful and fruitful to many in private and to many in public life’ (776a-b; 
transl. H.N. Fowler modified54). The mention of the philosopher’s filiva, which makes a 
second appearance later in the work55, is followed by a plea for a philosophy that ‘strives to 
make everything that it touches active and efficient (praktikav) and alive, inspires men with 
impulses which urge to action, with judgements thatle d them towards what is useful’ (776c-
d). After all, it would have been absurd had the Stoic Panaetius refused to accompany Scipio 
Aemilianus on an embassy to Egypt and Asia Minor. With a nice feeling for irony Plutarch 
stages that refusal: 
Now what should Panaetius have said? ‘If you were Bato or Polydeuces or some other 
person in private station who wished to run away from the midst of cities and quietly 
in some corner solve or quibble over the syllogisms of philosophers 
(ta; mevsa tw'n povlewn ajpodidravskein boulovmeno", ejn gwniva/ tini; kaq' hJsucivan ajn
aluvwn sullogismou;" kai; †perievlkwn† filosofw'n), I would gladly welcome you and 
consort with you; but since you are the son of Aemilius Paulus, who was twice consul, 
and the grandson of Scipio Africanus who overcame Hannibal the Carthaginian, I will 
not converse with you.’ Is that what he should have said? (777b; transl. H.D. Fowler 
modified) 
Plutarch, undoubtedly familiar with Callicles’ tirade56, thus echoes the attack on otherworldly 
philosophers with consent: 
Plu.: ta; mevsa tw'n povlewn ajpodidravskein 
Grg. 485d: feuvgonti ta; mevsa th'" povlew" 
Plu. = Grg. 485d: ejn gwniva/ 
However, the attack on otherworldly philosophy does not entail a denunciation of philosophy 
across the board. Plutarch is no Callicles. Timid philosophers who make themselves look 
ridiculous with every worldly undertaking (cf. Grg. 484d: pra'xin) are being mocked indeed, 
but a philosophy effecting praktikav (776d) and not shunning public life (776b: oJ feuvgwn; 
776c: hJmei'" de; feuxouvmeqa;; 778a: oujde; feuvgei; 778b: ouj feuvxetai) is, on the contrary, 
encouraged. 
                                                          
53 On the text-critical problem in the first sentence se  Roskam 2009, pp. 147-150. 
54 All translations of Plutarch are taken from the Loeb Classical Library. 
55 The theme of iliva reappears when Plutarch points out that the goal (tevlo") of human lovgo" – both the 
mental (lovgo" ejndiavqeto") and the uttered (lovgo" profovriko") kind – is filiva (777c). Plutarch himself admits 
that this theory of two lovgoi is anything but new. His linking of the familiar theory of the two lovgoi to filiva is 
however considered original by Roskam 2009, p. 101 (cf. pp. 96-105 for a discussion of the tradition). Perhaps 
we could compare this novel interpretation with Grg. 507d-508a, where the goal (skopov") of life is considered 
temperance insofar as this is in accordance with the filiva that holds everything together. 
56 Georgiadou 1995, p. 196. 
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 Plutarch opposes this political philosophy engaging in filiva with rulers to flattery: 
They who make those men good upon whom many depend confer benefits upon 
many; and, on the contrary (toujnantivon), the slanderers, backbiters, and flatterers 
(kovlake") who constantly corrupt rulers or kings or tyrants, are driven away and 
punished by everyone, as if they were putting deadly poison, not into a single cup, but 
into the public fountain which, as they see, everyone uses. (778d-e) 
Subsequently, Plutarch quotes from Eupolis’ comedy The Flatterers and goes on to contrast 
the flatterers of a private person with the flatterers of a ruler. The former only corrupt that 
single individual, thus doing relatively small damage, while the latter corrupt ‘many through 
one’ (778d: pollou;" di'eJnov"), thus being the exact opposite of political philosophers who 
benefit ‘many through one’ (777a: pollou;" di'eJnov"). 
In Plutarch’s Maxime cum principibus, as in Plato’s Gorgias, we encounter filiva as 
opposed to kolakeiva as a characterization of the philosopher’s practice. Although parrhsiva 
is obviously part and parcel of the philosopher’s speaking truth to power, this is not 
explicitely brought up here57. We find the nexus of filiva (an important theme in many of 
Plutarch’s works58), kolakeiva and parrhsiva completed and again related to the practice of 
                                                          
57 Roskam 2009, pp. 124-125: ‘The counterpart of the politiko;" filovsofo" […] are the slanderers, denouncers, 
and flatterers […]. [W]hereas the friend always promotes what is honourable and assists the better part of the 
soul, trying to strengthen and to preserve what is sound and making use of salutary and useful frankness 
(parrhsiva) in order to cure what has to be cured, the flatterer primarily tickles the negative part of the soul.’ The 
characterization in Maxime cum principibus of the otherworldly philosopher being ‘afraid of every whisper’ 
(776b: yofodehv") could perhaps be compared to the description in the Gorgias of the otherworldly philosopher 
‘whispering’ (485e: yiqurivzonta). Both characterizations link the avoidance of parrhsiva (by not daring to 
speak in the Gorgias, by not daring to listen in Maxime cum principibus) to cowardice (cf. the semantic analysis 
of yofodehv" in Roskam 2009, pp. 151-152). The true philosopher, as is apparent from the Gorgias, is the one 
who engages in dialogue, who practices dialectic. In Maxime cum principibus the philosopher’s readiness to 
enter a dialogue is crucial as well (776b: prosdialevghtai; 776c: dialevgesqai; 777b: dialevxomai; 778a: 
dialegovmeno"). Cf. also the Greek manuscript title of the work (with the caveat of Roskam 2009, p. 72 n. 6 that 
it is not certain whether or not it can be traced back to the author): 
Peri; tou' o{ti mavlista toi'" hJgemovsi dei' to;n filovsofon dialevgesqai. 
58 Friendship is an important theme in Plutarch’s work. See, in addition to the works discussed here, esp. De 
amicorum multitudine (with Van der Stockt 2011 and Giannattasio Andria 2000). The theme reoccurs in 
numerous other works from the Moralia (e.g. Amatorius, De fraterno amore, De capienda ex inimicis utilitate 
with Pérez Jiménez 2005, Coniugalia praecepta, De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando, De amore prolis, De 
invidia et otio, Praecepta gerendae reipublicae, …) as well as in the Lives (see Brokate 1913, pp. 48-61; 
Lucchesi 2007; Giannattasio Andria 2008, pp. 147-148). Lost are furthermore a Letter on friendship 
(Peri; filiva" ejpistolhv), fragments of which survive (fr. 159-171 Sandbach wit  Aguilar 2002, pp. 22-25; 
Giannattasio Andria 2008, pp. 139-141). It is possible that other works devoted to friendship were written by 
Plutarch, since the Lamprias catalogue mentions two letters on friendship (n. 83 and n. 132). On Plutarch and the 
theme of iliva see esp. O’Neil 1997 and also Heylbut 1876; Brokate 1913, pp. 1-31; Ziegler 1951, pp. 200-204; 
Fraisse 1974, pp. 434-441; Pizzolato 1993, pp. 187-192; Konstan 1997, pp. 98-106; Russell 2001, pp. 91-97; 
Aguilar 2002; Grossel 2005; Teodorsson 2007; Giannattasio Andria 2008; Beneker 2012, pp. 17-39. On politica  
friendship in Plutarch see Van der Stockt 2002; on p litical friendship in antiquity see Hutter 1978, pp. 25-56; 
Konstan 1997, pp. 60-67; von Heyking – Avramenko 2008, pp. 21-114. 
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philosophy in How to tell a flatterer from a friend (Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur 
or simply De adulatore et amico)59.  
Here Plutarch addresses the prince Philopappus, the grandson of the last king of 
Commagene and an important figure on the Athenian political stage60. The addressee alone 
leads one to suspect that the treatise will bear some relation to politics61; in other words: there 
seems to be a thematic unity with Maxime cum principibus. T. Engberg-Pedersen went as far 
as to suggest that the treatises are two sides of the same coin. Both works discuss the filiva 
between philosopher and ruler and both show one side of that relation. While Maxime cum 
principibus was an exhortation for philosophers to pursue filiva with rulers, De adulatore et 
amico is an exhortation for rulers to accept filiva with philosophers62. 
The same picture of the flatterer reoccurs, along with the same quotation from Eupolis 
(50d, cf. also 54b). Again Plutarch states that the flatterer would be relatively harmless if only 
he aimed at unimportant individuals. Alas he continually has his eyes on ‘ambitious, honest, 
and promising characters’ (49b; transl. F.C. Babbitt) and thus ‘oftentimes overturns kingdoms 
and principalities’ (49c). This is underscored by examples from the political realm (e.g. 56e-
f)63. The most effective way to distinguish the flatterer from a friend is to look at parrhsiva, 
‘friendship’s very own voice’ (51c: ijdivan […] fwnh;n […] th'" filiva"; transl. modified). 
Contrary to the flatterer, the friend knows how to apply parrhsiva in a wholesome way, viz. 
in a way that combines it with eu[noia (66d; 67d; 72a; 73a; 74c, cf. 59d)64. 
                                                          
59 There is some discussion about the unity of De adulatore et amico. Some scholars (Brokate 1913, pp. 5-7; 
Gallo 1988a, pp. 18-19 and passim; Sirinelli 1989, pp. 67-71) consider the work as an artificial composition of 
two separate treatises, the first of which (chapters 1-24) discussed friendship and flattery while the second 
(chapters 25-37) was devoted to parrhsiva. Engberg-Pedersen 1996 and Van Meirvenne 2002a, pp. 143-144;  
2002b, pp. 257-259 have adduced convincing arguments to cast doubt on that strict distinction. 
60 Philopappus is addressed at 48e and 66c. He is characterized by Sirinelli 1989, p. 66 as ‘un des personnages 
les plus importants de la cité’. He organized the Dionysia twice. Trajan adlected him to the senate and appointed 
him consul suffectus in 109. On his relation with Plutarch see Jones 1971, p. 59; Sirinelli 1989, pp. 65-66; Puech 
1992, pp. 4870-4873; Whitmarsh 2006, pp. 93-94. 
61 For a political interpretation of De ad. et am., taking the dedication to Philopappus to be more than a 
formality, see Engberg-Pedersen 1996 and Van Meirvenne 2002a. However, the caveat of Van Meirvenne 
2002a, p. 142 should be taken into account: ‘There are traces that suggest a political aspect in De ad. et am., but 
only very discreet ones. […] This essay is thus primarily about true friendship and about the nature, behavior, 
and tasks of a true friend, who clearly must also be a philosopher.’ Foucault 2001, pp. 133-138 only discusses 
parrhsiva in De ad. et am. as private parrhsiva. See however the sound criticism of Opsomer 2009, pp. 92-93. 
62 Engberg-Pedersen 1996, pp. 68-69 and passim. 
63 Van Meirvenne 2002a, p. 142 connects these passages (De ad. et am. 49c; 56e-f and Max. cum princ. 778d).  
64 Forms of parrhsiva and parrhsiavzomai occur no less than 76 times in De ad. et am., which covers 65 Loeb-
pages. The forms ajparrhsivaston (51c) and ajntiparrhsiazomevnou (72e) can be added to this count. Cf. O’Neil 
1997, p. 116: ‘This word-group [scil. parrhsiva, parrhsiavzomai, parrhsiasthv"] may be the most commonly 
used one in Plutarch’s (as well as other authors’) di cussions of friendship. In many ways the idea may be 
considered the very foundation of the relationship, for proper use of parrhsiva is the surest mark of a true friend, 
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This last remark suggests that Plutarch is not talking about Cynic parrhsiva65 or about 
frankness as discussed by the Epicurean Philodemus in hi treatise On frankness. Cynic and 
Epicurean parrhsiva do not take eu[noia into consideration66. Although the Peripatetic 
tradition is rightly named as the most important influence for Plutarch in De adulatore et 
amico67 and the themes of filiva, kolakeiva and parrhsiva are obviously not absent from the 
Peripatetic tradition68, it is not unlikely that some aspects of Plutarch’s notion of iliva, like 
his emphasis on the importance of eu[noia for parrhsiva, can be considered distinctly Platonic 
and can ultimately be traced back to the Gorgias. I will confine myself to these aspects. 
Plutarch underlines the difficulty of distinguishing a flatterer from a friend (50c-51a). 
The reason for this is that the flatterer almost flawlessly succeeds in imitating the friend: 
kolakeiva is a mivmhsi" of filiva (e.g. 50a; 51c; 52b; cf. Grg. 511a)69; the flatterer even 
imitates the friend’s parrhsiva (59b-61d). The crucial difference lies in the fact that the 
flatterer only aims at pleasure and thus only imitates the pleasurable part of friendship, while 
the real friend aims at the good (50a; 51b-c; 54d-55e70). This can be compared to the 
condemnation Plutarch expresses in Maxime cum principibus for those who see friendship 
merely as a source of reputation, thus only engagin in ‘a deceptive, showy, and shifting 
appearance in lieu of friendship (th'" filiva" ei[dwlon)’ (777e, cf. Grg. 463d)71.  
That ei[dwlon and mivmhsi" are deceptive is quite trivial for a Platonist. Therefore, it 
cannot come as a real surprise that in De adulatore et amico, as an opposite to the flatterer, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
whereas improper use points to a flatterer or an enemy.’ On parrhsiva in De ad. et am. see Gallo 1988a, pp. 7-
26; 1988b; Engberg-Pedersen 1996; Opsomer 1998, pp. 151-5 and 2009; Van Meirvenne 2002a. 
65 At 69c parrhsiva kunikhv is condemned. 
66 On Epicurean parrhsiva see Glad 1996; Konstan e.a. 1998; Scarpat 2001, pp. 72-75; Foucault 2001, pp. 109-
115; Erler 2011. Gallo 1988b has shown that the links that can be found between Philodemus’ Epicurean notion 
of parrhsiva and that of the notorious anti-Epicurean Plutarch are merely general topoi. On Cynic parrhsiva see 
Branham 1994, pp. 346-348; Kennedy 1999; Vaage 1992; Scarpat 2001, pp. 75-85; Foucault 2001, pp. 115-113; 
Foucault 2009, pp. 152-289. Roskam 2009, p. 79 contrasts the method of the political philosopher in Maxime 
cum principibus with Cynic parrhsiva. 
67 Heylbut 1876; Brokate 1913, pp. 7-11; Ziegler 1951, p. 802; Gallo 1988, p. 25 and passim; Sirinelli 1989, p. 
69; Giannattasio Andria 2008, p. 141-142. 
68 Cf. e.g. Heylbut 1876; Price 1989, pp. 103-161; Konstan 1997, pp. 67-78; Schroeder 1997; Mulhern 2004. It 
should be noted that, while Aristotle considers parrhsiva characteristic of iliva, this aspect is much less 
emphasized than in the case of Plato: parrhsiva is merely one of the many characteristics of the friend (EN 9, 
1165a, cf. Gallo 1988a, p. 14, who draws the same conclusion considering the peripatetic tradition in general). 
69 This is emphasized and discussed by Whitmarsh 2006. 
70 Cf. 66a and 67f, where Plutarch points out that parrhsivazesqai is more important than carivzesqai. 
71 Cf. De ad. et am. 53a: ‘[The flatterer], like a mirror, only catches the images (eijkovna") of alien feelings, lives 
and movements’; 53b: ‘I have no use for a friend that shifts about just as I do and nods assents just as I do (for 
my shadow better performs that function)’. In the Peripetatic tradition, on the other hand, flattery is not seen as a 
weak imitation of friendship. Aristotle sees flattery much rather as an excess, distorting the mesovth" which is 
filiva (EN 1159a: uJperecovmeno" ga;r fivlo" oJ kovlax, cf. Gallo 1988a, p. 15). That the image of the flatterer 
imitating friendship was however present in Plato’s Gorgias is overlooked by Konstan 1997, p. 101: ‘While 




who is ‘variable and many in one’ (52b) and ‘nowhere constant, with no character of his own’ 
(53a), we encounter... the (Platonic) philosopher, whose concern is divine truth and the good 
as understood by Plato (49a) and whose motto is ‘Know thyself’ (49b; 65f: gnw'qi sautovn) – 
the philosopher’s motto par excellence72. Friends are philosophical companions in search of 
truth (53b: sunalhqeuvonto" kai; sunepikrivnonto", cf. 59d; 62c). This reflects in their caring 
for each others soul: 
One mode of protection, as it would seem, is to realiz  nd remember always that our 
soul has its two sides: on the one side are truthfulness, love for what is honourable, 
and power to reason, and on the other side irrationlity, love of falsehood, and the 
emotional element; the friend is always found on the better side as counsel and 
advocate, trying, after the manner of a physician, to foster the growth of what is sound 
and to preserve it; but the flatterer takes his place on the side of the emotional and 
irrational, and this he excites and tickles and wheedl s, and tries to divorce from the 
reasoning powers by contriving for it divers low forms of pleasurable enjoyment. 
(61d-e)73 
Like the philosopher in the Gorgias, the friend in De adulatore et amico is likened to 
the physician throughout the work74. The friend resembles the physician in aiming for the 
good instead of the merely pleasurable (54e-55b), the medicine (favrmakon) used by the friend 
being a judiciously applied parrhsiva (74d-e; cf. 55b; 60b; 66a-b; 67e-f; 73a-b). Although the 
comparison of the friend and the physician (as wellas that of the philosopher and the 
physician, which also occurs in Max. cum princ. 776d) is a topos75, it cannot but remind us of 
the classification of tevcnai in the Gorgias when Plutarch goes on to compare flattery to 
cookery (51c; 54f-55a), cosmetics (54d76) and sophistry (71a)77. Parrhsiva, on the other hand, 
should be appreciated as a true craft (74d: dei' kai; peri; th;n parrhsivan filotecnei'n). Thus, 
                                                          
72 Van Meirvenne 2000, pp. 143-144: ‘True friends are represented as true philosophers, i.e. well-trained persons 
capable of judging between good and bad on their own, and devoted to a life of truth-fulness (ajlhvqeia), nobility 
(to; kalovn), and dignity (to; semnovn). […] De ad. et am. can be considered a strong moral call for a 
philosophical way of living.’ Cf. Konstan 1997, p. 101; Engberg-Pedersen 1996, p. 68. 
73 Like most other Middle-Platonists, Plutarch regarded the bipartite (rather than the familiar tripartite) division 
of the soul as the correct understanding of Plato’s psychology (De virtute morali 441e-442b, cf. Dillon 1996, p. 
194). It should be added, however, that Plato himself in the Republic (4.439e) posits a basic bipartition upon 
which the more refined tripartition is based, as an anonymous reviewer rightly remarked. See also Opsomer 
2012, pp. 321-22 for this point. 
74 On references to medicine in the Gorgias, see Vegetti 1967. 
75 On the comparison of the friend and the physician see Bohnenblust 1905, pp. 38-39, who also indicates further 
passages in De ad. et am. and interestingly remarks that the comparison does n t occur in Aristotle. On the 
comparison of the philosopher and the physician in Plutarch see Fuhrmann 1964, pp. 41-43 and pp. 149-157, as 
well as Saïd 2005, pp. 22-23, who considers the Platonic influence to be obvious (contra e.g. Gallo 1988b, p. 
125 who emphasizes the topicality). 
76 Perhaps 60b could be read in the same framework. Plutarch laughingly compares the flatterer, who tries to 
imitate the physician, to a hairdresser – ‘imagine a man using a surgeon’s lancet to cut the hair and n ils of a 
person suffering from tumours and abcesses’ – thus indicating that, while medicine is a real tevcnh, cosmetics is 
merely kolakeiva. 
77 Cf. Opsomer 2009, pp. 114-116, who connects Plutarch’s account of tevcnh in De ad. et am. with the 
classification of crafts in the discussion with Polus. 
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in De adulatore et amico the philosopher – both Socrates (69f; 70f; 72a) and Plato (52d-f; 
67c-e; 69f; 71e, cf. Max. cum princ. 777a; 779b-c) serve as textbook examples – appears as 
the ideal friend and parrhsiasthv", as opposed to the mimicking flatterer. 
2.2 Maximus of Tyre was probably born ca. 120 – 125, at the very end of Plutarch’s life. At 
some point in his life – most likely during the reign of the emperor Commodus (180 – 191) – 
he was in Rome delivering philosophical orations (dialevxei")78. In the manuscripts, one of 
these orations bears the title By what criteria should one distinguish flatterer from friend 
(Tivsin cwristevon to;n kovlaka tou' fivlou, Or. 14)79. That alone should remind the reader of 
Plutarch’s De adulatore et amico80. 
The oration begins with an adaptation of Prodicus’ myth about Heracles, who is 
prompted to choose between two roads, one of which has Pleasure as a guide, the other Virtue 
(apud Xenophon, Mem. 2.1.21-34). Maximus substitutes Pleasure for the Flatterer, Virtue for 
the Friend. The former may be ‘pleasant to the eye’(h{disto" ijdei'n), the latter is ‘truthful’ 
(ajlhqevstato"). The former is ‘full of praise’ (ejpainw'n) and promises extraordinary pleasures 
(hJdonav"), the latter ‘says little, but what he does say is the naked truth: that the rough part of 
his road is long and the smooth part short’ (Or. 14.1, transl. M.B. Trapp81). From the outset 
the difference between flattery and friendship is clear: as in Plato and Plutarch, flattery only 
has an eye for pleasure while friendship aims at the good. The difference between the flatterer 
as singer of empty praise and the friend as truth-teller sounds familiar as well. 
Through a barrage of topoi, the differences are further explored in the rest of the 
oration82. Of more interest for our purposes, however, are two extrapolations at the end of the 
surviving part of the text. First Maximus warns forthe political consequences of flattery (7-8): 
most harmful are ‘flatterers whose rewards [are] not trivial, not confined to the pleasures of 
                                                          
78 For a vague reconstruction of Maximus’ life (inevitably so, given the scarcity and unreliability of the sources), 
see Trapp 1997a, pp. xi-xii. 
79 Trapp 1997a, p. lviii doubts the authenticity of the manuscript titles. See however Koniaris 1982, pp. 102-110 
for an elaborate argumentation in favour of authenticity. 
80 Since all parallels between Maximus’ Or. 14 and Plutarch seem to be topoi, it is impossible to establish 
whether Maximus was influenced by Plutarch. Cf. Trapp 1997a, p. 125: ‘[T]he general position taken [by 
Plutarch] is the same as Maximus', but there are no very close similarities of detail between the two 
discussions.’; Szarmach 1985, p. 106: ‘[W]ahrscheinlich entnahm er [i.e. Maximus] ihm [i.e. Plutarch] einige 
Gedanken’. Contra Volpe Cacciatore 2000, p. 528: ‘[l’]opuscolo plutarcheo [i.e. De adulatore et amico] da cui 
naturalmente Massimo Tirio non poteva prescindere’. Volpe Cacciatore 2000 provides a stylistic and rhetorical 
comparison of Plutarch’s De ad. et am. and Maximus’ Or. 14, while Van der Stockt 2011, p. 37-38 initiates a 
comparison of Plutarch’s De amicorum multitudine and Maximus’ other oration about friendship (Or. 35), which 
mainly explores the link between friendship and virtue. 
81 All translations of Maximus are by Trapp 1997a; for the Greek, Trapp 1994 is used. 
82 For an overview of the topoi Maximus uses in this oration and their sources, see Puiggali 1983, pp. 411-15. Cf. 
also the general overview of topoi about friendship in Bohnenblust 1905 and the discus ions of Or. 14 in 
Puiggali 1983, pp. 402-416 and Szarmach 1985, pp. 105-1 0. 
22 
 
food and sex, but made up instead of the misfortunes of the whole of Greece’. This is the kind 
of flatterers Maximus says to be flourishing in democracies, a thought well familiar to the 
reader of the Gorgias83. The second extrapolation (8) concerns the realm of crafts. More 
explicitly than Plutarch, Maximus repeats the classification of true crafts and kolakeivai as 
established in the Gorgias84. By this extrapolation Maximus spells out the link dicated in 
the Gorgias between friendship in the personal/ethical realm and friendship in a broader 
context. Like Plato and Plutarch he calls cookery (tevcnhn ojyopoii>kh'") a flattery of medicine. 
Sycophancy replaces the flattery of the rhetoric craft, which Maximus apparently refrained 
from calling a kolakeiva. Finally, sophistry is considered a flattering imitation of philosophy. 
At this point the text in the manuscripts unfortunately breaks off. How much has been 
lost is unclear85. Did Maximus continue the extrapolating tendency of his discourse? Did he 
explore the subject of the philosopher as a friend, like the opposition of flattering sophistry 
and philosophy might have indicated? That philosophy is the via regia to friendship is after all 
emphasized in Maximus’ other oration on friendship (Or. 35.8). Was there a rebuke of 
otherworldly philosophers? Reprimands à la Callicles often occur in Maximus’ discourses 
(Or. 1.8; 21.4; 27.8; 30.1; 37.2). Did he go on to tackle the subject of parrhsiva? In similar 
contexts he repeatedly did. In the oration on Socrates’ trial parrhsiva is opposed to kolakeiva 
and established as the method of the true philosopher (Or. 3.7)86. In the first oration on 
Socratic love, Socrates, a philosophical model if there ever was one87, is characterized by his 
parrhsiva twice (Or. 18.4-5) and in the second oration on this same subject Socratic love is 
called the source of filiva, distinguished by parrhsiva (Or. 19.4). 
 These questions obviously must remain unanswered, but it is beyond doubt that the 
subjects of friendship, flattery and – albeit perhaps only in other orations – frankness were 
dear to Maximus and that he linked them to the practice of philosophy, of which he saw 
himself as a representative88. In any case we unmistakably encounter in Or. 14 the double 
                                                          
83 This passage is linked to the Gorgias by Puiggali 1983, p. 415: ‘Le démagogue est le flatteur du peuple. Cette 
idée, qui vient du Gorgias 466a et que l’on retrouve chez Aristote Pol. IV 4, 1292a 20, était devenue banale. 
Maxime la développe en 20, 7e [i.e. Or. 14, 7 Hobein/Trapp/Koniaris].’ 
84 Puiggali 1983, p. 416 presumably refers to this second link with the Gorgias when he indicates ‘à la fin, un 
élargissement de la notion de kolakeiva inspiré du Gorgias’. Cf. also Trapp 1997a, p. 131 n. 17 and p. 132 n. 19-
20. 
85 Trapp 1997a, p. 132 n. 21. 
86 Puiggali 1983, p. 414 sees a reference to the topic of frankness in Maximus’ mention that ‘the friend desires 
truthfulness in all dealings’ (ajlhqeiva" ejn th'/ koinwniva/, Or. 14.6). 
87 Cf. e.g. Or. 3 on Socrates’ trial. Cf. Puiggali 1983, p. 571: ‘Maxime voue un véritable culte à Socrate’. 
88 On Maximus’ self-presentation as a philosopher, see esp. the introductory Or. 1 and also e.g. Or. 4; 22; 25; 29. 
Lauwers 2009; 2012; 2015 has particularly drawn attention on Maximus’ self-presentation as a philosopher, thus 
questioning the modern presentation of Maximus as a Halbphilosoph (e.g. von Christ 1961 [= 1924], p. 767), an 
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function of friendship and flattery: both on the level of individual ethics and on the more 
general level of the crafts. We can be fairly certain hat this is a reminiscence of Plato’s 
Gorgias. 
2.3 Not unlike Maximus, Themistius (ca. 317 – ca. 385) can be labeled as a philosophical 
orator89. As a philosopher involved in politics, on the other and, he seems to resemble 
Plutarch. In 355 the emperor Constantius adlects him to the senate of Constantinople. By then 
he has been running a philosophical school in the same city for a decade90. Soon, however, he 
becomes a fully-fledged politician and a prominent ambassador for Constantinople91. 
Nevertheless, Themistius kept considering himself first and foremost a philosopher 
throughout his life92. And even though the most of his 34 surviving orati ns are imperial 
panegyrics (Or. 1-19), from the so-called ‘private’ orations (Or. 20-34) one can certainly see 
emerging a competent philosopher, albeit perhaps not ‘the best of philosophers’, as Libanius 
called him (Ep. 1186)93. 
 In Or. 22 Themistius tackles the theme of filiva. He starts off with a complaint: people 
enjoy listening to stories about war and strife without wanting to learn about friendship (264c-
265a). However, this charge is corrected straight away, for the orator cannot, after assuring 
himself of his listeners’ attention (attentum parare) with a provocative opening, risk losing 
their goodwill (benevolum parare). As it turns out, the problem is not that the audience, 
whose inquisitiveness is beyond dispute (docilem parare)94, does not want to be instructed on 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
invented category which obviously has nothing to do with how the author saw himself. On Maximus’ self-
presentation see also Trapp 1997b, pp. 1950-1954. On Maximus’ notion of philosophy it is interesting to 
compare the account of Szarmach 1983, pp. 13-44, who affirms the view of Maximus as Halbphilosoph, with 
that of Lauwers – Roskam 2012, who pay attention to Maximus’ self-presentation. 
89 Both practiced the genre of diavlexi", which combines philosophy with rhetoric. Cf. Themistius’ Or. 28, 
entitled JH ejpi; tw'/ lovgw/ diavlexi". Interestingly, Roskam 2009, pp. 25-28 argues that Plutarch’s Maxime cum 
principibus falls under the genre of the diavlexi" as well. On the genre and its characteristics see Puiggali 1983, 
pp. 23-33. 
90 From that stage of his career some important paraphrases of Aristotelian works survive (edited in CAG 5.1-6). 
91 In 357 he visits Rome in the presence of Constantius, around the same time assuming the proconsulship of is 
city. A year before his death we find him holding the office of urban prefect, a function that has superseded the 
proconsulship by then. On Themistius’ life and works, see esp. Vanderspoel 1995 and also Maisano 1995,pp. 9-
48; Leppin – Portmann 1998, pp. 1-26; Penella 2000, pp. 1-48; Heather – Moncur 2001, pp. ix-xvi. 
92 Cf. Or. 21, where Themistius ironically argues that he is not a philosopher; Or. 23 and 29, where he defends 
himself as a philosopher after being accused of being a sophist; Or. 24, where he recommends himself as a 
teacher of philosophy; Or. 31 and 34, where he points out that he did not betray philosophy by accepting public 
office. 
93 See Penella 2000, pp. 6-9 for the distinction (introduced by modern editores) between lovgoi politikoiv and 
lovgoi ijdiwtikoiv. 
94 Cf. 265b: ‘You are, after all, eager to listen (filhvkooi); you gladly pay attention to every word spoken to you.’ 
It is not surprising that, in a philosophical oration of this kind, docilem parare boils down to affirming the 
inquisitiveness of the audience a priori. After all, they have come to listen to a philosopher: their showing up 
alone indicates that they will be eager to listen to whatever the philosopher chooses to talk about. Still the 
affirmation of the inquisitiveness is all but futile: by stating that his listeners are filhvkooi, the philosopher 
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the topic of friendship. The real problem is that they are never given the opportunity to be so 
instructed: 
What you do not seem to me to have many opportunities to hear, however, are orations 
that can improve people’s lives. This is no fault of y urs; it is the fault of those so-
called philosophers, who have assumed that it was enough for them to whisper their 
words to the young in some isolated corner. They thoug t, as Callicles put it in his 
criticism [of Socrates], that they could avoid the center of the city and those gathering 
places wherein the poet says that men gain distinction 
(ejn gwniva/ movnh/ pro;" ta; meiravkia yiqurivzein, feuvgein de; ta; mevsa th'" povlew" 
kata; to;n Kalliklevou" ojneidismo;n kai; ta;" ajgorav", ejn ai|" fhsin oJ poihth;" ajri
prepeva" televqein tou;" a[ndra"). Well, we must let those philosophers stay where 
they want to stay; it will be my duty to bring speech out into the light and to accustom 
it to tolerate the crowd and to put up with noise and with the clamor of the seated 
assembly. If speech is capable (iJkanoiv) of benefiting people individually, it certainly 
will be able to benefit many individuals at once. (265b-c; trans. R.J. Penella95) 
 Again, as in Plutarch’s Maxime cum principibus, Callicles’ criticism of the 
otherworldly philosopher is repeated with consent: 
Them.: ejn gwniva/ movnh/ pro;" ta; meiravkia yiqurivzein 
Grg. 485d-e: meta; meirakivwn ejn gwniva/ triw'n h] tettavrwn yiqurivzonta 
Them.: 
feuvgein de; ta; mevsa th'" povlew" kata; to;n Kalliklevou" ojneidismo;n kai; ta;" ajgo
rav", ejn ai|" fhsin oJ poihth;" ajriprepeva" televqein tou;" a[ndra" 
Grg. 485d: 
feuvgonti ta; mevsa th'" povlew" kai; ta;" ajgorav", ejn ai|" e[fh oJ poihth;" tou;" a[nd
ra" ajriprepei'" givgnesqai 
Callicles’ reprimand must have been particularly dear to Themistius: it occurs more than once 
in his orations and he seems to have known it by heart96. Consequently, he also takes it to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
assumes that the audience is worthy of philosophy. T is works as a self-fulfilling prophecy: the audienc  will of 
course try and live up to that standard. 
95 Unless indicated otherwise, all translations of Themistius are from Penella 2000; for the Greek, Downey – 
Norman 1965-1974 is used. 
96 Or. 2.30b-c: ‘[You probably reckon a philosopher is some ne who] likes to keep on nagging about virtue and 
courage and manliness to three or four boys (pro;" meiravkia triva hJ tevttara) while sitting in his little chair, 
through weakness not being able to peep out of his little house’ [my transl.] (cf. Grg. 485d-e: 
meta; meirakivwn ejn […] triw'n h] tettavrwn); Or. 23.284b: ‘Those who are shooting arrows at me, then, do not 
want to come out into the open (proelqei'n) and stand in your midst (ejn mevsw/), where they could be seen. They 
lie hidden somewhere, in secluded spots and caverns ( jn gwnivai" pou katadeduvkasin h] chramoi'")’ (cf. Grg. 
484d: ejpeida;n ou\n e[lqwsin ei[" tina […] pra'xin, katagevlastoiv ei[sin; 485d: 
feuvgonti ta; mevsa th'" povlew" […] katadedukovti […] ejn gwniva/); Or. 26.313d [Themistius voices his 
otherworldly critics]: ‘He does not sit quietly in his room and converse solely with his pupils; instead, he comes 
out into the public arena, does not hesitate to appe r in the very heart of the city (ejn tw'/ mevsw/ th'" povlew"), and 
ventures to speak before all sorts of people’ (cf. Grg. 485d: ta; mevsa th'" povlew"); Or. 28.341d: ‘As for the 
descendants of Socrates [i.e., philosophers], in our day they have vanished and become nonentities – 
understandably and deservedly so. For they are fearful (I know not why) and wary of public assemblies, where 
the poet says men become famous, and they cannot bear o look away from their couches and secluded corners 
(frivttousiv te kai; eujlabou'ntai ta;" ajgorav", ejn †ai|" fhsin oJ poihth;" ajriprepeva" televqein tou;" a[ndra",
 kai; oujk ajnevcontai parakuvptein e[xw tou' skivmpodo" kai; th'" gwniva")’ (cf. Grg. 485d: feuvgonti […] 
ta;" ajgorav", ejn †ai|" e[fh oJ poihth;" tou;" a[ndra" ajriprepei'" givgnesqai, katadedukovti […] ejn gwniva/); Or. 
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heart: as opposed to the otherworldly philosopher, who was not able to say anything powerful 
(Grg. 485e: iJkanovn), Themistius has the ambition to speak words that are highly effective 
(iJkanoiv)97. Although the modus operandi is different98, the message again resembles that of 
Maxime cum principibus (776c-777b; 779f-779c): the philosopher should come out of his 
isolated corner because in that way he can have a gr ater impact. By teaching his listeners 
about true and sincere friendship – the one thing of which he is a devotee (266a: 
eJno;" dev eijmi kthvmato" ejrasthv", filiva" ajlhqinh'" kai; ajdovlou) – and thus improving their 
lives, Themistius establishes himself as a true philosopher and as a true friend, thus linking 
the themes of friendship and philosophy by means of his own persona99. 
 After this exploit of self-presentation, Themistiu turns to a member of the audience 
who is singled out as the ‘leader of this chorus’. Just like the speaker he is said to be truly 
devoted to friendship (266c). Themistius goes on by arguing that, although friendship is 
important for a person not involved in politics (ijdiwvth/), it is far more important for ‘the man 
who oversees many cities and much territory’ (266d). This remark leaves little doubt that the 
‘leader of the chorus’ was a prominent political figure100. By commending the politician for 
giving heed to friendship and thus obliquely encouraging him to be or become his friend, 
Themistius repeats the other side of Plutarch’s message: while the philosopher should be open 
to friendship with public figures (Max. cum princ.), the powers that be should take friendship 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
34.12: ‘For right from the beginning, when I was young, I chose not to practice philosophy in secluded corners 
(th;n ejn tai'" gwnivai" filosofivan)’ (cf. Grg. 485d: ejn gwniva/). I take it there are several indications that 
Themistius is quoting Callicles’ reprimand by heart. (1) Themistius changes the word order. (2) Plato mentions 
the flight from the ajgorav" before placing the philosopher jn gwniva/; Themistius turns it around, even though 
mentioning ejn gwniva/ in the second place would have made a better transition to the next sentence. (3) 
Themistius partly restores Homer’s language (Il.  9.441: oujd' ajgorevwn, i{na t' a[ndre" ajriprepeve" televqousi), 
which Plato modernized, by not contracting the ending in ajriprepeva" and by using the epic verb televqw. 
97 Criticism on the otherworldly stance of contemporary philosophy often occurs in Themistius’ orations. In Or. 
17; 31; 34 he responds to the philosophers who found that by accepting the office of urban prefect he betrayed 
philosophy. In Or. 26 and 28 he responds to the critiques of (mostly Neoplatonic) philosophers who found fault 
with Themistius for addressing large audiences. Even in several of his imperial panegyrics he emphasized the 
importance of philosophy for political affairs (see L ppin – Portmann 1998, pp. 23-24). 
98 Themistius addresses ‘many individuals at once (pollou;" a{ma)’, while Plutarch urges the philosopher to 
benefit ‘many through one’ (Max. cum princ. 777a, cf. supra). 
99 There are further suggestions that for Themistius fr endship and philosophy (viz. the kind of philosophy 
Themistius professes) go hand in hand. (1) The benific ce of both is emphasized at the beginning of the oration 
(264d: friendship; 265c: philosophy). (2) To recognize true friendship one needs the assistance of Athena, viz. of 
(philosophical) wisdom (267d). (3) In the allegory at the end of the oration the right hand of Friendship is Good 
Judgment (Frovnhsi") (280c-282c) – a philosophical ally if there ever was one. Friendship herself, moreover, 
appears as an ideal philosopher: ‘She had a soul that was more visible than her body’ (281b). 
100 Penella 2000, pp. 17-18 reports H. Scholze’s generally accepted opinion that the ‘leader of the chorus’ is the 
emperor Valens but leaves open the possibility that T emistius was addressing another emperor or high-level 
official. Maisano 1995, p. 735 argues that the emperor Constantius is the addressee. 
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– and preferably friendship with philosophers – more seriously than anyone else (De ad. et 
am. 49c)101. 
 The remainder of the oration, which concludes with the Prodicus myth already 
narrated by Maximus102, is devoted to methods by which one can find, chase and hold on to 
friendship. As in the case of Plutarch and Maximus, most of the arguments are topoi, mostly 
taken from the Peripatetic tradition103. To my mind, however, there are some distinctive 
reminiscences of Plato’s Gorgias when Themistius discourses on the possibility thate quest 
for friendship can go wrong. Right from the start Themistius urges to guard against ‘pretense’ 
(uJpovkrisi"), which ‘mimics friendship’ (filivan mimei'tai) (267b). This warning against ‘the 
villainous ability to mimic true friendship’ (hJ pro;" th;n mivmhsin kakourgiva, ibid.) brings to 
mind both Plutarch’s warning against kolakeiva as a mivmhsi" of real friendship and Plato’s 
distinction between real and false crafts (flatteries)104. Somewhat further Themistius indeed 
tackles the theme of friendship and flattery105:  
Now there is a big difference between a friend and  flatterer. What really puts them 
worlds apart is that a flatterer praises everything in his associate, whereas a friend 
would not let you off if you go wrong. […] Thus we must gently free our friends from 
their [moral] diseases, not causing them much pain but not letting them go untreated 
either. Physicians often leave the knife aside and cure an ailment painlessly by 
administering drugs (favrmaka). This is also how you should treat a friend. You t o
can heal your friend by using drugs insead of cautery and surgery. The drugs I refer to 
are words – not sweet words intended to charm, but words brimming with goodwill 
and frankness (eujnoiva" kai; parrhsiva"). (276c-277a) 
Themistius continues to develop the theme of parrhsiva and its similarity to the practice of 
the physician for a while106. He concludes by pointing out the contrast between th  good 
physician and the false physician who is only concer ed with the pleasure of his patients. The 
                                                          
101 This double dynamics of philosophy (philosophers should engage in public life and the public should pay
heed to philosophers) is an important line of argument throughout Themistius’ orations. The interpretation set 
out in Méridier 1906 is built around this theme.  
102 Bohnenblust 1905, pp. 16-22 compares both accounts. Konstan 1997, p. 154 takes the reoccurence of this 
myth as an indication that Themistius’ oration was inspired by Maximus’. 
103 See Colpi 1987, p. 102 and the discussions of Or. 22 by Pizzolato 1993, pp. 197-202; Konstan 1996a, pp. 16-
18 and 1997, pp. 153-156; Van der Stockt 2011, pp. 31-35 (in comparison with Plutarch’s De amicorum 
multitudine). 
104 At the end of the oration the close association betwe n pretense (uJpovkrisi") and flattery (kolakeiva) is 
revealed: flattery ‘goes in advance of pretense’ (282d). Pretense is, in other words, the consequence of flattery. I 
do not see any indication for the rather sharp distinction Konstan 1996a, pp. 17-18 and 1997, pp. 153-1 4 tries to 
draw between the two concepts. 
105 The flatterer is mentioned briefly and opposed to the friend for the first time at 272d, where Themistius 
discusses praise. 
106 Although his core business was imperial panegyric, Themistius claims never to have lost his parrhsiva (cf. 
e.g. Or. 34.14). On Themistius’ (political) parrhsiva see esp. the thorough study by Gerhardt 2003 and also 
Brown 1992, pp. 61-70; Vanderspoel 1995, p. 13; Penella 2000, p. 3. Many valuable insights on how Themistius 




latter is not worthy of the name “physician”: he is merely a ‘wine-pourer or table-setter’ 
(277b-c). 
 Once again – as we saw in Plato, Plutarch and Maximus107 – the ethics of friendship is 
closely linked with the classification of real crafts and flatteries, the friend resembling the 
physician as opposed to the flatterer, who merely mimics the craft and only cares about 
pleasure. Returning to Themistius’ reprimand of the otherworldly philosopher we can infer 
once again that the philosopher who does not hide in a corner is the true friend and that 
philosophy is the true craft of friendship. Needless to say that by ‘philosopher’ and 
‘philosophy’ the audience is supposed to understand first and foremost Themistius and his 
craft. 
2.4 In the cases of Plutarch, Maximus and Themistius the rejection of the isolated philosopher 
could not possibly have come as a real surprise. Our last author, Damascius (ca. 462 – after 
538 AD108), is undoubtedly the odd one out. Neoplatonists were for a long time considered to 
have advocated purely otherworldly philosophies without showing any interest in social 
ethics109. Moreover, Damascius, the last head of the Athenian Academy, is still regarded as a 
particularly difficult Neoplatonist, indulging in the most abstruse and complex metaphysical 
problems110. 
 Apart from commentaries and treatises, Damascius also wrote the Life of Isidore (Vita 
Isidori), at the same time a biographical tribute to his teacher Isidore and a history of 
Platonism from the mid-fifth century on. The work survives in fragments. In this Vita, which 
has unfortunately been studied to a large extent as a merely historical source111, we get a 
remarkable characterization of the ideal philosopher: 
                                                          
107 It is beyond doubt that Themistius had a thorough knowledge of Plato’s works. Although as a professional 
philosopher he was mostly occupied with the study of Aristotle, Plato has a special place in Themistius’ orations 
as a literary and philosophical model (cf. Colpi 1987, pp. 85-93). We can be less sure about his knowledge of 
Plutarch and Maximus (and of philosophers other than Pl to and Aristotle in general). Certainly there a
numerous remarkable thematic parallels with Plutarch nd Maximus (Colpi 1987, pp. 131-143 on Plutarch and p. 
145 n. 255 on Maximus). It is, however, hard to establish whether these parallels emerge from Themistius’ direct 
acquaintance with these authors: they could be mediated through other authors or have become ethical lo i 
communes in his time. Cf. Colpi 1987, p. 19 on the problem of Quellenforschung in Themistius. Volpe 
Cacciatore 2005, p. 490 n. 18 claims, inconclusively to my mind, that Plutarch’s De ad. et am. is ‘presente 
nell’orazione temistiana [i.e. Or. 22]’; Van der Stockt 2011, p. 32 n. 39 rightly is more careful. 
108 On the dating of Damascius’ life see Combès 1986, pp. ix-xi. On his life and works in general Hoffmann 
1994 is the most complete account. See also Van Riel 2010. 
109 Fortunately, with scholars like O’Meara 2003, who reacts vigourously against the assumption that 
Neoplatonists had no political philosophy – an assumption he calls ‘the conventional view’ (pp. 3-5) – the times 
are changing. 
110 Cf. Zeller 1963, pp. 901-902 and Strömberg 1946, p. 176, but also more recently Van Riel 2010, pp. 672- 3. 
111 I know of only two exceptions: Masullo 1987 and O’Meara 2006. I disagree, however, with O’Meara’s 
philosophical interpretation of the work. O’Meara takes it that Damascius composed the Vita Isidori with the 
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People tend to apply the label ‘virtue’ to a life of hating everyday business 
(th'/ misopravgmoni zwh'/). I do not agree with this view, for the virtue whic  engages in 
the midst of public life through political activity and discourse 
(hJ ga;r ejn mevsh/ th'/ politeiva/ dia; tw'n politikw'n e[rgwn te kai; lovgwn ajnastrefo
mevnh ajreth;) fortifies the soul and strengthens through exercis  what is healthy and 
perfect, while the impure and feigned element that lurks in human lives is fully 
exposed and more easily set on the road to improvement. And besides, politics offers 
great possibilities for doing what is good and usefl; also for courage and firmness. 
That is why the learned, who sit in their corner and philosophise at length and in a 
grand manner about justice and moderation, utterly disgrace themselves if they are 
compelled to come outside and take some action 
(oiJ ejn gwniva/ kaqhvmenoi lovgioi kai; polla; filosofou'nte" eu\ mavla semnw'" peri; 
dikaiosuvnh" kai; swfrosuvnh", ejkbaivnein ejpi; ta;" pravxei" ajnagkazovmenoi deina; 
ajschmonou'sin). Thus bereft of action, all discourse appears vain and empty. (fr. 124 
A = fr. 324 Z; transl. P. Athanassiadi modified112) 
Just like Plutarch and Themistius – and this time it is more surprising – Damascius refers 
assentingly to Callicles’ tirade against the otherworldly philosopher: 
Dam. = Grg. 485d: ejn gwniva/ 
Dam.: ejkbaivnein ejpi; ta;" pravxei" ajnagkazovmenoi deina; ajschmonou'sin 
Grg. 484d: 
ejpeida;n ou\n e[lqwsin ei[" tina i[divan h] politikh;n pra'xin, katagevlastoi  givgnont
ai 
Moreover, Damascius also resembles the previous authors in not considering this an attack on 
the whole of philosophy. Instead of shunning public life, the real philosopher engages in it. 
 Dam.: ejn mevsh/ th'/ politeiva/ 
 contra Grg. 485d: feuvgonti ta; mevsa th'" povlew" 
This makes the real philosopher once again the opposite f Callicles’ philosopher: he is not a 
coward, a runaway or a ridiculous figure. 
Not only does the great danger not come to a weak, as Pindar says, but equally the 
great man will not take on a small cause; but where oth rs desert (fugavde") and run 
away through unmanliness (ajnandrivan), he will risk himself in the fray where, as the 
poet says, ‘a man’s worth is brought to light’. (fr31B A = fr. 65 Z; transl. modified) 
 Dam.: fugavde" a[lloi di' ajnandrivan ajpodidravskousi 
 Grg. 485d: ajnavndrw/ genevsqai feugovnti 
 Dam.: e[nq' ajreth; diaeivdetai ajndrw'n kata; to;n poihthvn [Homer, Il. 13.277] 
 Grg.: ejn  ai|" e[fh oJ poihth;" tou;" ajndra" ajriprepei'" givgnesqai [Homer, 
Il.9.441] 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Neoplatonic theorem of the scale of virtues in mind. To my mind this scale, discussed by Damascius in his 
Commentary on the Phaedo and there ultimately leading up to other-worldliness (see Demulder – Van Riel 
2015; Gertz 2011, pp. 66-70; Van Riel 2012), is entir ly absent from the Vita Isidori. 
112 Translations of Damascius are by Athanassiadi 1999. I refer to the order of the fragments in her edition with 
A and to Zintzen’s 1967 edition with Z. While the former has the advantage of offering a translation, he latter is 
more reliable and complete and is used here for the Gre k text. 
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The last allusion is particularly elegant: although the quotations are different verses from the 
Iliad, Homer is referred to in the same way and the meaning of the verses is the same113.  
This general characterization is applied to the model philosopher Isidore with another 
possible allusion to the Gorgias. Callicles explained the ridiculousness of the philosopher 
engaging in real-life business by quoting from Euripides’ Antiope114: 
Each man shines in that and strives for it, devoting the greatest part of the day to it 
(nevmwn to; plei'ston hJmevra" touvtw/ mevro") where he finds himself best. (484e-485a) 
Damascius seems to refer to the same lines but applies them to the opposite message (viz. that 
the real philosopher is not merely an otherworldly figure)115: 
[Isidore] was not a lover of money, though thrifty b  nature. He was in all respects a 
wise manager of his household, and spent a large part of the day dealing with its 
affairs (poluv ti th'" hJmevra" eij" tau'ta ajnhvliske mevro"), both working himself, 
and giving instructions to others. (fr. 24B A = §24/fr. 50 Z) 
Indeed Isidore, instead of shunning the ajgorav (Grg. 485d: feuvgonti […] ta;" ajgorav") and 
not being able to defend himself in court (Grg. 486a-c; 521b-d) like Callicles described, was a 
philosopher who, as the head of the Platonic Academy, prosecuted defaulters himself before 
the courts of the ajgorav (fr. 24A A = fr. 53 Z: dikastw'n ajgoraivwn). He considered the 
philosopher to be ‘a greater benefactor than an excellent king’ (fr. 149B A = fr. 366 Z, cf. fr. 
26B A = fr. 24 Z) and laziness to be ‘as bad as any vice, perhaps the greatest of them all’ (fr. 
16 A = fr. 21-22 Z, cf. fr. 23 Z116). 
 Opposed to the worst of vices stands the ‘mother of virtues’: filiva, which our model 
philosopher is said to have cultivated more than any other virtue (fr. 26A A = fr. 49 Z). 
Furthermore, filiva is opposed to kolakeiva and entails parrhsiva: 
[Isidore] was extremely quick to do good deeds (eujergesivan) and even quicker to 
censure vice. This is why he often came into conflict with many people, as he could 
not bear to gloss over their wickedness; nor did he practice celebrated flattery instead 
of true friendship 
                                                          
113 This is enforced by the use of forms of ajnhvr, as opposed to ajnandriva and a[nandro", in both verses. 
Moreover, it is not unlikely that an author had thefe ling, due to their semantic affinity, that ajrethv and 
ajriprephv" were etymologically related (probably undeservedly so, according to Beekes 2010 s.vv. ajrethv, ajri-, 
a[risto"). Damascius in particular liked this kind of etymological ventures, cf. Strömberg 1946, pp. 185-187. 
114 On the allusions to Euripides’ Antiope in Plato’s Gorgias see e.g. Nightingale 1992. 
115 The parallel is indicated by Zintzen 1967 ad loc. The changes in the wording may lead one to suspect that his 
is rather a coincidence than a parallel. It should, however, be taken into account that various readings of the 
Antiope verse are attested (see fr. 184 TrGrFr). Particularly interesting (though not listed in TrGrFr) in 
explaining the change from nevmwn (Plato) to ajnhvliske (Damascius) is a paraphrase of the verse in an anoym us 
commentary on Aristotles’ Rhetoric: 
ejpi; touvtw/ spoudavzei e{kasto", i{na kai; o{pou aujto;" eJautou' kreivttwn faivnhtai, nevmwn kai; katanalivskwn
 ejntau'qa to; plei'ston mevro" th'" hJmevra" (CAG 21.2, p. 68). 
116 Athanassiadi omits Zintzen’s fr. 23. 
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(oujde meletw'n ajnti; th'" ajlhqinh'" filiva" th;n poluavraton kolakeivan). (fr. 15A A 
= §18 Z117; transl. modified) 
None of his [i.e. Isidore’s] friends ever accused him of making excuses for 
inaction or timorous hesitation in times of need, nor of the inactivity which is 
born of sloth or cowardice. But he himself brought such charges against many of 
his friends (fivlw'n). (fr. 16B A = fr. 64 Z) 
[Isidore] rebuked error, and exposed injustice and courageously checked wrong-doing 
with truly paternal frankness (patrikh'/ parrhsiva/). (fr. 15B A = fr. 18 Z)118 
Here as in the case of Plato, Plutarch, and Themistius, the philosopher’s parrhsiva is never 
bereft of eu[noia. Isidorus ‘did not harbour a censorious or resentful disposition towards 
anybody’ (fr. 15C A = §19 Z) and ‘he did nothing out of hostility or prejudice’ (fr. 68 Z119). 
Not only is parrhsiva a part of iliva, it is also an antidote to mimicking (fr. 23A A = fr. 45Z: 
prospoiouvmenon), which was characteristic of flattery in the Gorgias (464c, d)120. Isidore’s 
parrhsiva appeared from his consistency: he always ‘said […] the same things about the same 
subjects (ta; aujta; peri; tw'n aujtw'n) – about virtue and vice’ (fr. 12B A = fr. 75 Z; transl. 
modified), which was the main criterion of parrhsiva in the Gorgias121. 
 Once again we encounter the theme of filiva, kolakeiva and parrhsiva applied to the 
philosopher, who is encouraged to be anything but otherworldly. This rejection of the 
Neoplatonic cliché suggests that Neoplatonism is perhaps less monolithic than sometimes 
assumed. While in other works Damascius tends to consider politics beneath the task of the 
true philosopher, he encourages political activity in the Vita Isidori122. While he quotes 
Callicles and alludes to his speech with assent, the same Callicles is considered merely a sick 
and irrational man in a surviving Neoplatonic commentary123. 
2.5 In Plutarch, Themistius and Damascius – and Maximus certainly shared the same outlook 
– Callicles’ criticism of the philosopher remaining hidden in a corner was repeated with 
assent. These reminiscences, however, did not serveto eject philosophy as a whole, but to 
                                                          
117 Contra Athanassiadi 1999, p. 93 and p. 167 I see no reason to f llow LSJ s.v. poluavrato" in postulating for 
this word, next to the normal meaning ‘much-wished-for’, ‘much-desired’, a pejorative meaning ‘cursed’ which 
would only occur in Damascius’ Vita Isidori (here and in fr. 60 A = fr. 138 Z, where Salastius is aid to commit 
himself to ‘the popular forensic oratory’. Cf. Asmus 1911, p. 11 and p. 51. 
118 Cf. fr. 17 Z (omitted by Athanassiadi): ‘[Isidore] was very severe for who committed an error’. Plutarch 
(Praec. ger. reip. 802f) also mentions parrhsiva patrikhv. The opposition of ivloi and kovlake" reoccurs in fr. 
100A A = fr. 258 Z. The importance of friendship is suggested again in fr. 105D A = §163 Z. The dangers of 
flattery are mentioned in fr. 145B A = fr. 351 Z; fr. 146E A = fr. 358 Z. 
119 Omitted by Athanassiadi. 
120 Cf. also fr. 140D A = fr. 345, where a charlatan pretending to be a real philosopher 
(to; plavsma th'"  jAkamativou filosofiva") is exposed by Isidore. 
121 Compare the wording at Grg. 527d: taujta; dokei' peri; tw'n aujtw'n. 
122 On Damascius’ view on political virtue in his Commentary on the Phaedo see Demulder – Van Riel 2015. 
123 Olympiodorus, In Grg. 21.2; 25.1. 
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promote the philosopher’s engaging in real life. In other words: the authors took a part of 
Callicles’ tirade and integrated it in their notion f philosophy – with Callicles they went 
against Callicles. In the same context, they discussed the theme of filiva, its opposite 
kolakeiva and its asset parrhsiva and linked it to the practice of philosophy. Both motives are 
in a way connected. Both show consistency as an indispensable feature of philosophy. Filiva, 
by entailing parrhsiva, is a guarantee for the consistency of words which is essential in a 
philosophical conversation aiming for truth. The pla for a philosophy that does not shun 
public life, on the other hand, is to ensure consistency between words and deeds124.  
 All discussed texts thus reflect on the identity of the philosopher. All of them are in 
one way or another protreptics or even apologiae125, defending philosophy against the 
widespread prejudice that it was an otherworldly affair126. However, the authors had to be 
careful not to overstep the mark, lest they be label ed “sophists”127. Thus, the ideal 
                                                          
124 Grg. 488a-b: ‘If you [i.e. Callicles] catch me [i.e. Socrates] having agreed with you now, and later on not 
doing the same things that I agreed about (pravttonta a{per wJmolovghsa), count me a complete idiot, and don't 
bother to reprove me ever again, since I won't deserv  anything.’ Cf. 461c: ejn e[rgoi" kai; ejn lovgoi"; La. 188d-
189a where Laches delights in the harmony between th  speaker (i.e. the speaker’s deeds) and the words he 
speaks and goes on to accept that Socrates will speak with parrhsiva on account of Socrates’ deeds. Dodds 1959, 
p. 225 connects this with the theme of k lakeiva: ‘kolakeiva is the antithesis of the forthright integrity of word 
and act practised by Socrates’. See also Gadamer 1972 on consistency between lovgo" and e[rgon in Plato. On 
this topic in Plutarch in general (see notably De profectibus in virtute 79f; 84b-85b) and in Maxime cum 
principibus in particular see Roskam 2009, pp. 65-69, who consider  it one of the ‘basic pillar[s] on which the 
work rests’ (p. 65). Neither is it absent from De adulatore et amico, where the philosopher-friend is said to 
‘combine deeds with words’ (55c: to; e[rgon a{ma tw'/ lovgw/ sunh'yen). Maximus (e.g. Or. 25.1-2; 26.2) and 
Themistius (e.g. Or. 17.214a; 20.239d; 31.352c; 34.1) also state repeatedly that philosophy should combine 
lovgoi with e[rga. The occurrence of this topic in Damascius has already been indicated (fr. 124 A = fr. 324 Z, cf. 
fr. 23B A = fr. 46 Z). On the general importance of an author’s deeds for the interpretation of his words see 
Mansfeld 1994, pp. 177-191. 
125 F. Schleiermacher was the first to state that the Gorgias was Plato’s apologia pro vita sua, i.e. for the 
philosophical life (apud Dodds 1959, p. 31), cf. Kahn 1996, pp. 125-147, reading the Gorgias as ‘Plato’s 
manifesto for philosophy’ (see particularly p. 141). Cuvigny 1984, p. 7 spoke of Plutarch’s Maxime cum 
principibus as an apology for (political) philosophy as did Trabattoni 1985 in the case of Damascius’ Vita 
Isidori. 
126 Attention has been paid in due course to the authors’ rejections of otherworldly philosophy and their self-
presentation as philosophers. That the otherworldly character of philosophy was assumed by outsiders, appears 
for example from Damascius’ statement that ‘people (oiJ a[nqrwpoi) tend to apply the label “virtue” to a life of 
hating everyday business’ (fr. 124 A = fr. 324 Z). This can be compared to one of Plutarch’s eloquent attacks on 
otherworldly philosophy in An seni respublicam gerendam sit 796d-e: ‘Most people (oiJ polloiv) […] think of 
course that those are philosophers who sit in a chair and converse and prepare their lectures over their books; but 
the continuous practice of statesmanship and philosophy, which is every day alike seen in acts and deeds, they 
fail to perceive. For, as Dicaearchus used to remark, those who circulate in the porticoes [i.e. the peri atetics] are 
said to be “promenading”, but those who walk into the country or to see a friend (pro;" fivlon) are not’ (transl. 
H.N. Fowler). Plutarch goes on to describe the activities of Socrates, who ‘lounged in the market-place’ 
(sunagoravzwn) with his pupils instead of ‘seating himself in an rmchair’. That the same prejudice was 
ingrained in Themistius’ contemporaries appears from the fact that he had to defend himself against those who 
no longer considered him a philosopher once he had taken office (Or. 17; 31; 34). 
127 On Plutarch’s rejection of sophistry see Stanton 1973, pp. 351-353 (cf. e.g. De audiendo 43e-f, where 
parrhsiva is mentioned as the characteristic by which a philosopher can be distinguished from a sophist). 
Maximus, too, although one could see why one manuscript calls him ‘sophist and philosopher’ (Laurentiaus 
Conventi Soppressi 4), uses ‘sophist’ as a derogatory term, as we could see in the discussion of Or. 14 (cf. also 
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philosopher – according to these authors, who were obviously careful to make themselves 
meet that ideal – was neither an otherworldly intellectual nor a sophist. It must have been 
important to get that message out, not to their pees – that would merely be preaching to the 
choir – but to a larger audience128. After all, the philosophers had to position themslves 
strategically on the education market, which had numerous stallholders in a society without 
compulsory education, let alone a standardized curriculum. By identifying the practice of 
philosophy with filiva – and who is not looking for friendship? – and making it accessible to 
people who did not want to be otherworldly fanatics but were just looking for paideiva, the 
authors we discussed launched a powerful protreptic. While the sophist (like Callicles) is 
merely a flatterer and the otherworldly philosopher (like the philosopher from Callicles’ 
caricature) obviously lacks the involvement to be capable of iliva, these philosophers were 
the only ones who could truly utter these alluring words in front of their audience: ‘You have 
got a friend in me.’ 
3. Note: the unity of the Gorgias once again 
The thematic and structural unity (or the lack thereof) in the Gorgias has always been an issue129. To my mind, 
the criteria Socrates proposes for a philosophical dialogue (viz. ejpisthvmh, eu[noia and parrhsiva), positioned 
directly in the middle of the Gorgias, form one of the elements of the (organic) unity, in accordance with F. 
Schleiermacher’s intuition that this work was Plato’s apologia pro vita sua: an apology for philosophy. Complex 
irony is a technique used throughout the dialogue: of ach criterion the everyday, non-philosophical use voiced 
by Socrates’ interlocutors is proven to be deficient and is replaced by a philosophical interpretation of the same 
term.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
e.g. Or. 1.8; 18.4; 20.3; 26.2; 30.1). Themistius even devots two orations to defending himself against charges 
of sophistry (Or. 23; 29, cf. e.g. Or. 25.310c; 26.314a-315c). See Méridier 1906, who show how Themistius 
presents himself as a philosopher in opposition to both sophists and otherworldly philosophers. Finally, 
Damascius opposes philosophy to sophistry in fr. 62 A = fr. 140 Z; fr. 108 A = fr. 282 Z. 
128 Ziegler 1951, p. 703 ranks Plutarch’s De adulatore et amico under ‘popularphilosophische Schriften’ (cf. Van 
der Stockt 2011, pp. 19-21 on the notion of popular philosophy in Plutarch). Obviously, Maxime cum principibus 
does not fall under that category. However, although the work is aimed at students of philosophy (Roskam 2009, 
p. 28), it shows how Plutarch cared about Popularphilosophie by encouraging philosophers to conduct 
philosophy on a more popular level themselves. Maximus’ orations were aimed at beginners, particularly young 
adults (nevoi) and other interested people who had received a general education (cf. Koniaris 1982, pp. 113-114; 
Trapp 1997a, pp. xx-xxii). As a consequence, the philosophy in Maximus’ orations is not for specialists; it is 
‘philosophy made easy’ (Trapp 1997a, p. xvi). Themistius, then, praised his father because he made philosophy 
accessible to a large audience (Or. 20.235). Themistius evidently continued that mission (cf. Vanderspoel 1995, 
p. 37). As a consequence, the audience of the oration of friendship is described by Penella 2000, p. 17 as ‘a 
mixed urban audience’. We can assume indeed that the audience of the so-called private orations was more 
heterogenous than that of the public orations, consisti g mainly of senators (see Heather – Moncur 2001, p. 29-
38 for a detailed reconstruction of that audience). In Or. 26; 28 Themistius defends himself against critics who 
found fault with him for addressing a large audience, considering that unworthy of a philosopher. Finally, the 
intuition of Athanassiadi 1999, p. 27 that, in his V ta Isidori, Damascius is ‘addressing a wider audience, the 
educated man beyond the confines of a purely philosophical milieu’ is undoubtedly sound (cf. also pp. 47-48). 
129 Cf. Dodds 1959, pp. 1-5 and more recently e.g. Stauffer 2006. 
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(1) The conversation with Gorgias tackles the issue of ejpisthvmh. The question is of what tevcnh Gorgias 
possesses ejpisthvmh – Socrates himself calling Gorgias’ endeavors ejpisthvmh (449d) and tevcnh (447c; 448e; 
449a; 453a; 454a; 455c)130. In the end Gorgias contradicts himself in first claiming that rhetoric is amoral (456d-
457), then insisting on the moral aspect of his craft (460a). His ejpisthvmh is shown to be ambiguous (460c-d), 
and therefore not being an ejpisthvmh in the Socratic sense at all. (2) The discussion with Polus raises the subject 
of eu[noia (i.e. what one should wish for oneself and others). Against Polus’ opinion that suffering injustice is 
worse than committing it and that it is always better o escape punishment, Socrates states on the contrary that 
there is nothing worse than committing injustice and that it is a sign of concern (480a: khdhvtai) to bring charges 
first and foremost against oneself and one’s friends (480a: tw'n fivlwn). Polus’ understanding of eu[noia turns out 
to have nothing to do with eu[noia in the Socratic sense. (3) As has been shown, Callicles’ parrhsiva is very 
different from parrhsiva in the Socratic sense.  
The transitions between the three parts are smooth: P lus takes up the issue of ejpisthvmh from Gorgias (461b-
466a) before discussing questions related to eu[n ia; Callicles on his part starts by discussing what he and Polus 
consider to be u[noia (viz. saving the body at all costs; 481b-486d, cf. 486a: eujnoiva/) before the subject is 
changed to mainly parrhsiva. The cumulative character of the criteria is implied by this structure: while the 
discussion with Gorgias is confined to ejpisthvmh, the discussion with Polus combines questions of ejpisthvmh 
and eu[noia and Callicles’ part tackles all three subjects. After Callicles has dropped out of the conversation (i.e. 
he only remains present to flatter Gorgias), the thr e criteria, which have been mainly deconstructed by Socrates’ 
negative irony, are reconstructed positively by including them in the practice of philosophy. Philosophy 
combines the three criteria rightly and can thus be een as ideal filiva: its ejpisthvmh, eu[noia and parrhsiva heed 
the cosmic filiva. 
Two recurring motives are interwoven in this structure; both concern the practice of philosophy. On the 
individual level of philosophical conversation Socrates often reminds his interlocutors of the rules of dialectic 
(e.g. 447c; 449b-c; 453a-c; 454b-c; 457c-458b; 461a; 461e-462a; 471e-472c; 474a-b; 475e-476a; 482a-c; 495a-
b). On the more general level of the philosophical cr ft the classification of tevcnai, which opposes real crafts to 
kolakeivai, is recurrent (462d-466a; 500a-501c; 517c-518a), cf. the opposition of the orator and the physician 
(456a-b; 459a-b) as well as the comparison of the philosopher and the physician, who in turn is placed in 
opposition to the cook (e.g. 521a)131.  
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